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Resolution in International 
Investment Agreements
Susan D. Franck!
Henry Ward Beecher once observed, “[l]aws and institutions are constantly 
tending to gravitate … [and] [l]ike clocks, they must be occasionally cleansed 
and wound up, and set to true time.”1 Beecher’s comments re! ect that, as law, 
societies and governments evolve, there are inevitably challenging transitional 
periods that require a re-examination of the foundations upon which a system 
was founded. Dispute resolution systems are no di" erent. When they undergo 
fundamental growth, a re-consideration of the system’s e#  cacy and utility can 
promote both its integrity and legitimacy to ensure it provides appropriate 
services to its stakeholders.2
International investment law has experienced a particular growth. While the 
number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) expanded in the past four decades,3 
! Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. Email: sfranck2@unl.edu.
1 Henry Beecher, Life ! oughts, Gathered from the Extemporaneous Discourses of Henry Ward Beecher 
(Philips, Sampson and Company: 1858), p. 129.
2 For the purposes of this chapter, the word “stakeholder” is intended to refer to those persons or entities 
either directly or indirectly a" ected by investment-related con! icts. Stakeholders most commonly take 
the form of home countries, host countries, investors and the citizens of host countries.
3 “Bilateral Investment Treaties in the mid-1990s,” UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998) 
[Hereina$ er UNCTAD 1998].
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there has also been a more recent growth of disputes arising under these 
agreements.4 Unsurprisingly, the escalation in the availability and use of the 
dispute resolution process has led to a teething period. % e boundaries of States’ 
previously untested international law obligations are being sketched; and parties 
and non-parties have both cheered and jeered the e#  cacy, e#  ciency and 
fairness of the system for resolving investment disputes. Given these develop-
ments, the system may have evolved to the point where it would be useful to 
clean the proverbial clock.
% is chapter explores, on a preliminary basis, how “dispute systems design” 
could aid the dispute resolution process in investment treaties and permit 
stakeholders to make a more informed choice about their dispute resolution 
options. In other words, it considers whether the resolution of investment-
treaty disputes might be re-designed to minimize the cost of con! ict and 
maximize its bene& cial byproducts. It & rst discusses the role of con! ict and 
the design of dispute resolution systems. Given the potential insights from 
dispute systems design, it next assesses the unexplored or under-explored 
utility of dispute resolution options along the dispute resolution continuum. 
% e chapter concludes by suggesting that a systematic greater consideration of 
dispute systems design is needed in order to diagnose accurately what the 
system requires and generate a set of principles to guide the design process. 
% e hope of such an endeavor would be to develop an e" ective, e#  cient, fair 
and legitimate process for resolving investment treaty con! ict.
Confl ict, Dispute Systems Design and Investment Treaties
Reconsidering Con! ict
In the classic formulation, con! ict is like water. It occurs naturally and, although 
its structure can be transformed, it will continue to exist. Despite its social 
connotation, con! ict is not per se good or evil. Rather, it is necessary for insti-
tutions to survive, thrive and develop. Nevertheless, extreme circumstances—
whether a ! ood or a drought—can have serious repercussions on e" ective 
development.5
4 “Research Developments in International Investment Agreements,” UNCTAD Research Notes, UNCTAD/
WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1, 30 August 2005 (http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/webiteiit20051_
en.pdf) [Hereina$ er UNCTAD 2005a], pp. 1–3, 13–15; and “Investor-State Disputes Arising from 
Investment Treaties: A Review,” UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/4, (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_
en.pdf) [Hereina$ er UNCTAD 2005b], pp. 4–6.
5 Cathy Costantino and Christina Sickles Merchant, Designing Con" ict Management Systems: A Guide to Creating 
Productive and Healthy Organizations (Jossey-Bass: 1996) [Hereina$ er Costantino and Merchant 1996].
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% is applies with equal force in the context of international investment.6 
Con! ict between investors and host country governments can occur when 
there is dissatisfaction with an interaction, process or result. Con! ict can be a 
positive force, however. For investors, it can create opportunities for commercial 
innovations, and governments can use it as an occasion to adapt how they 
legislate and regulate those they govern.
When con! icts do arise, they can o$ en be addressed informally without the 
threat of legal sanctions—o$ en because of personal relationships, the ability 
to adapt business models or regulatory discretion that permits parties to 
address their underlying needs and interests. % ese informal processes 
can fail, however, and con! ict can crystallize as a formal dispute. At either 
the formal or informal stage of con! ict management, having a properly 
designed dispute resolution system can constructively draw con! ict to the 
surface, channel its productive forces and avoid potentially more destructive 
by-products.
Approaches to Dispute Resolution
% ere is a robust literature dedicated to designing disputing systems to manage 
con! ict.7 % is systematic approach to dispute resolution has been surprisingly 
e" ective in reducing the negative by-products of con! ict. Part of using dispute 
systems design e" ectively, however, is to understand the di" erent approaches 
to dispute resolution.
In their pioneering work on dispute systems design, Ury, Brett and Goldberg 
articulated a systematic way of looking at dispute resolution procedures. It 
identi& ed three fundamental approaches parties can use to resolve disputes: 
(1) using power (in the form of violence, war, strikes) to impose a solution;
(2) relying on legal rights to determine the merits of parties’ positions; and
(3) focusing on parties underlying interests to create mutually acceptable
6 J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 4th Edition (Cambridge University Press: 2005) [Hereina$ er 
Merrills 2005], p. 1.
7 Costantino and Merchant, 1996; Allan J. Stitt, Alternative Dispute Resolution for Organizations: How to 
Design a System for E# ective Con" ict Resolution (Wiley: 1998) [Hereina$ er Stitt 1998]; William L. Ury, 
Jeanne M. Brett and Stephen B. Goldberg, Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs of 
Con" ict (Jossey-Bass: 1988) [Hereina$ er Ury et al. 1988]; see also Susan D. Franck, “Integrating Investment 
Treaty Con! ict and Dispute Systems Design,” 92 M'((. L. R)*. 161 (2007) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=969252) [Hereina$ er Franck 2007].
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solutions that meet parties’ needs. Ury et al. expressed a general preference for 
interest-based dispute resolution as it tends to reduce transaction costs, 
improve satisfaction with the result and decrease the probability that disputes 
will recur. Nevertheless, they acknowledged that there are circumstances when 
resolving disputes on the basis of rights or power may be necessary—or simply 
desirable—particularly where uncertainty about the boundaries of parties’ 
legal rights inhibits negotiation, or when a fundamental societal value is at 
stake.8 Later scholars have suggested that many dispute resolution systems 
might start with power-based dispute resolution methods, but they eventually 
move toward a more rights-based methodology and ultimately evolve to 
interest-based con! ict management.9
Having articulated these primary approaches to resolving disputes, Ury and 
his colleagues suggested that institutions create e" ective con! ict management 
systems by engaging in: (1) diagnosis of the current system, (2) creation of a 
dispute resolution system according to practical principles,10 (3) implementation 
8 Ury et al. 1988, pp. 4–17.
9 Costantino and Merchant 1996, pp. 49–54.
10 Originally, Ury et al.’s principles related to: (1) focusing on interests to encourage the use of interest-based 
dispute resolution, (2) providing loop-backs to make procedures available that allow parties to return to 
lower-cost dispute resolution methods, (3) providing low-cost interest-based rights and power or rights-
based procedures if the interest-based ones fail, (4) building in consultation before and a$ er disputes, 
(5) arranging the procedures in a low-to-high cost sequence, and (6) providing the motivation, skills and 
resources necessary to ensure that the procedures are supported (Ury et al. 1988). Others have since 
developed di" erent, but related, principles. 
Costantino and Merchant, for example, use six di" erent guiding principles including: (1) developing 
guidelines for whether ADR is appropriate, (2) tailoring the ADR process to the particular problem, 
(3) building-in preventative methods of ADR, (4) making sure that disputants have the necessary knowl-
edge and skill to choose and use ADR, (5) creating ADR systems that are simple and easy to use and 
resolve the disputes early, at the lowest organizational level, with the least bureaucracy, and (5) allowing 
disputants to retain maximum control over choice of ADR method and the selection of a neutral. 
(Costantino and Merchant, 1996).
Shari"  has continued this analysis in an international context and suggests analyzing issues of member-
ship, scope, centralization, control and ! exibility. He suggests these issues should be considered in con-
junction with the following principles, namely that institutions should: (1) strive for inclusiveness by 
incorporating into their structure all stakeholders likely to be a" ected by the institution’s work, (2) seek 
broad coverage of many related issues of interest to the institutional membership rather than being lim-
ited to a speci& c or narrow issue area, (3) seek depth of jurisdiction on individual issues areas such that 
they are empowered to take many kinds of action on issues within their mandate, (4) seek to build central 
sources of information gathering and dissemination, (5) decentralize and proliferate discussions and con-
versations among institutional members in multiple forums and forms, (6) vest control over decisions in 
those most interested and a" ected by them, and (7) embed opportunities for regular review of principal 
design decisions in order to integrate learning from experience (Khalil Z. Shari" , “Designing Institutions 
to Manage Con! ict: Principles for the Problem Solving Organization,” 8 H+,*. N)-./. L. R)*. 113 (2003) 
[Hereina$ er Shari"  2003]).
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and approval of the new design, and (4) evaluation of the design and di" usion 
of the procedures to the rest of the institution.11 Using these tools, Ury and his 
colleagues transformed distressed dispute systems—where parties resolved 
small con! icts by immediate resort to power struggles—into healthier systems. 
% eir e" orts focused on designing dispute systems that permit interest-based 
dispute resolution and, should these e" orts fail, relied upon rights-based 
adjudication—and only used power as a last resort. % is remodeling of the 
dispute resolution architecture had signi& cant bene& ts. Not only was there an 
improvement in the result, institutional integrity and ongoing relationships, 
but there were also reduced transaction costs in terms of lost time, money, 
emotional investments and opportunities.12
Investment Treaties and Dispute Resolution Options
Given its success, Ury’s conception of dispute systems design has grown 
beyond its original use in U.S. domestic law.13 Commercial entities and govern-
ment institutions increasingly resort to con! ict management to establish a 
web of dispute settlement methods to meet the particular needs of the parties’ 
and the dispute.14 Even with its success in these other contexts, there has been 
surprisingly little literature that considers the utility of dispute resolution 
design for investment disputes arising from or related to bilateral investment 
treaties.
% ere does appear, however, to be a need for a more systematic consideration 
of dispute resolution options. Commentators question whether the dispute 
11 Costantino and Merchant have a similar approach. % ey recommend & rst identifying and involving the 
appropriate stakeholders and then & nding an appropriate dispute systems designer to conduct an organi-
zational assessment. Next, create a design architecture to consider where, when and how to use ADR on 
the basis of identi& ed principles. A$ er training and educating the stakeholders on the use of the system, 
the program can then be implemented, evaluated and revised as necessary (Costantino and Merchant 
1996).
12 Ury et al. 1988.
13 Lisa Bingham, “Mediation at Work: Transforming Workplace Con! ict at the United States Postal Service,” 
IBM Center for the Business of Government (2003) [Hereina$ er Bingham 2003]; Peter Robinson, Arthur 
Pearlstein and Bernard Mayer, “DyADS: Encouraging ‘Dynamic Adaptive Dispute Systems’ in the 
Organized Workplace,” 10 H+,*. N)-./. L. R)*. 339 (2005) [Hereina$ er Robinson et al. 2005].
14 Francisco Orrego Vicuña, “Arbitration in a New International Alternative Dispute Resolution System,” 
18(2) News from ICSID (2001) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-18-2-1.htm) [Hereina$ er 
Vicuña 2001]; Shari"  2003.
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resolution system is in crisis,15 while UNCTAD suggests concerns “could be 
addressed by improving the dispute settlement procedures” and ICSID revises 
its arbitration procedures.16 Presumably changes might reduce & nancial 
exposure (of investors and host countries), improve public perception of how 
investment disputes are managed and possibly prevent future disputes. 
Irrespective of whether change is needed or implemented, if the re-evaluation 
is done in a transparent and co-operative manner, the process of evaluating 
has the potential to strengthen the credibility and institutional legitimacy of 
the process of resolving investment disputes.
% is section will & rst consider the historical roots and current dispute 
resolution systems embossed in investment. It will then consider various 
dispute resolution options and evaluate their unique costs and bene& ts. 
% erea$ er, the future of managing investment treaty con! ict can be assessed 
in light of the current structure and other potential options.
a. ! e Evolution of Investment Dispute Resolution
Recall how con! ict scholars suggest that dispute systems evolved. Costantino 
and Merchant suggested early systems focus on power dynamics; but as they 
transform, there is a focus on judicialization and rights-based adjudication; 
and ultimately systems evolve toward a more interest-based con! ict management 
system.17 Likewise, Ury et al. observed that systems are o$ en distressed where 
they resort to the use of force or power as a matter of course to resolve 
disputes; but when systems focus on rights and interests, they become more 
e" ective and e#  cient.18 % is is not dissimilar from the evolution of the resolution 
of investment treaty con! ict.
15 Susan D. Franck, “% e Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law % rough Inconsistent Decisions,” 73 F.,01+2 L. R)*. 1521 (2005) [Hereina$ er Franck 2005a]; 
Charles H. Brower, II, “Structure, Legitimacy and NAFTA’s Investment Chapter,” 36 V+(0. J. T,+(3(+/’4 
L. 37 (2003) [Hereina$ er Brower 2003]; Ari A& lalo, “Towards a Common Law of International Investment: 
How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve % eir Legitimacy Crisis,” 17 G).. I(/’4 E(*/4. L. R)*. 51,
88 (2004) [Hereina$ er A& lalo 2004].
16 UNCTAD 2005b, pp. 53–54; ICSID, “Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration,” 
(22 October 2004), (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.pdf) [Hereina$ er ICSID 
2004]; ICSID “Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations: Working Paper of the ICSID 
Secretariat,” (12 May 2005) (http://worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf) [Hereina$ er 
ICSID 2005]; ICSID C.(*)(/'.( R54)3 +(0 R)-54+/'.(3, ICSID/15 (April 2006) (http://worldbank.
org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm) [Hereina$ er ICSID Basic Documents 2006].
17 Costantino and Merchant 1996, pp. 49–54.
18 Ury et al. 1988.
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Governments historically relied on the use of force and “gunboat diplomacy” 
to resolve investment disputes. Given the costs—and the failure of this process 
to encourage foreign investment—States evolved away from this model. 
Instead, they shi$ ed to a focus on rights. In an e" ort to promote foreign invest-
ment and instill con& dence in the stability of the investment environment, 
States promulgated treaties that created substantive obligations.19 % ese e" orts 
primarily began with so-called “Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation,” and ultimately developed into more structured investment agree-
ments (such as BITs) or other investment agreements (such as multilateral 
agreements, for example the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] 
and the Energy Charter Treaty [ECT]).20 % e treati& cation of rights and 
obligations marked a shi$  away from power-based dispute resolution and a 
move toward the development of a rights-based system of neutral adjudication. 
% is sea change a" ected two main areas of international investment law. First, 
it o" ered a new, mutually agreed set of substantive rights to foreign investors 
for rights, including expropriation, national treatment and fair and equitable 
treatment.21 Second, for the & rst time, States o" ered foreign investors a dispute 
resolution system that permitted investors to enforce directly their new 
substantive rights against a host government.22
% is second aspect is noteworthy. It meant that investors were not simply 
granted an illusory promise—they were also granted a forum for redressing 
violations of their substantive rights. Prior to this development, when govern-
ment conduct adversely a" ected their investment, investors were relegated to 
a series of somewhat unappealing dispute resolution options. % ese options 
o$ en le$  investors to the political mercies of either their own or the host
country government in deciding how (if at all) to address an investor’s
complaints. Speci& cally, investors might attempt to negotiate directly with
government o#  cials—but they would o$ en be ignored. Likewise, they might
lobby government o#  cials in their home jurisdiction to either engage in
diplomatic negotiations with the host country government or espouse a claim
before the International Court of Justice—and they would o$ en be ignored.
19 Franck 2005a, pp. 1525–1526; Kenneth J. Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice 
(Kluwer: 1992), pp. 7–22.
20 M. Sornarajah, International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press: 1994) [Hereina$ er 
Sornarajah 1994], pp. 231–237; Guillermo A. Alvarez and William W. Park, “% e New Face of Investment 
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11,” 28 Y+4) J. I(/’4 L. 365 (2003), pp. 366–367.
21 Giorgio Sacerdoti, “Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection,” in Recueil 
Des Cours, vol. 269 (Brill Academic: 1997) [Hereina$ er Sacerdoti 1997].
22 Franck, 2005a, pp. 1541–1545.
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Investors also might consider suing host country governments in their home 
country courts—but this was o$ en fruitless where host countries had recourse 
to the defense of sovereign immunity.23 In other cases, investors might have to 
address the con! ict unilaterally. % ey might simply absorb the cost of adverse 
government action by either doing nothing or making a claim under their 
political risk insurance.24 In extreme cases, investors might consider resorting 
to physical violence as a self-help remedy.25
% e “arbitration addition” was revolutionary. It gave investors direct—and 
nearly unfettered—access to host country governments, which promised to 
resolve claims arising under investment treaties through what amounted to a 
sophisticated choice of forum clause.26 Although there may be preconditions 
to arbitration,27 once the conditions are satis& ed, treaties typically give investors 
the right to make an election amongst pre-determined dispute resolution 
options to resolve a dispute.28 Once an investor makes the election, the host 
country government must resolve the matter under the investor’s preferred 
methodology. For example, investment treaties permit investors to choose 
among: (1) litigating disputes before the host country government’s national 
courts, (2) arbitrating disputes before ICSID or (3) arbitrating disputes before 
an ad hoc tribunal that is bound by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.29
Part of this “judicialization” of managing investment treaty con! ict may be 
due in part to an evolution in the use of and expectations about international 
23 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th Edition (Oxford University Press: 2003), 
pp. 677–715; Sacerdoti 1997, pp. 412–415.
24 Jeswald W. Salacuse, “Explanations for the Increased Recourse to Treaty-Based Investment Dispute 
Settlement: Resolving the Struggle of Life Against Form?” in Karl Sauvant, ed., Coherence and Consistency 
in International Investment Law (Oxford University Press: 2007); Franck 2005a, pp. 620–621.
25 % e BBC has reported on a British-owned gold mining company in Ghana that allegedly engaged in a 
practice of shooting illegal miners on sight. Angus Stickler, Ghana’s Ruthless Corporate Gold Rush (18 July 
2006) (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/& le_on_4/5190588.stm). % e story does not indicate 
whether this action was part of the company’s normal commercial operation or was, perhaps, a result of 
the government’s failure to provide full protection and security.
26 Susan D. Franck, “% e Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do 
Investment Treaties Have A Bright Future?” 12 U.C. D+*'3 J. I(/’4 L. 6 P.4’7 47 (2005) [Hereina$ er 
Franck 2005b].
27 See infra section A(3)(b) for a discussion of the current system of resolving investment disputes, includ-
ing the use of non-binding dispute resolution and other preconditions to arbitration.
28 Christopher Schreuer, “Traveling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the 
Road,” 5 J. W.,40 I(*)3/. +(0 T,+0) 231 (2004) [Hereina$ er Schreuer 2004].
29 % is is one area in which investor-State and State-to-State dispute resolution diverge. State-to-State arbi-
tration does not generally permit a government to make an election as to the & nal dispute resolution 
method.
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arbitration. Historically, arbitration was not a forum where decision-makers 
were prized for their impartiality; rather, arbitrators’ value came in their 
exercise of expert professional discretion, facility to create unique solutions, 
ability to recommend settlement terms to parties, capacity to act as an internal 
partisan during deliberations, or some combination of these factors.30 
Under these conditions, the popularity of international arbitration waxed and 
waned over time.31 As it has evolved in an international context, however, 
arbitration has shi$ ed away from a group of “grand old men” dispensing 
discretionary wisdom. Instead, in the twentieth century, the process has 
blossomed. Today, international arbitration technocrats focus on creating a 
fair and impartial process that results in an award based upon the factual 
record and independent legal analysis.32
Part of this judicialization may account for arbitration’s success in the resolution 
of public and private international disputes. In the private international law 
context, as international trade has ! ourished, arbitration has become the 
primary vehicle for the resolution of international commercial disputes. Its 
popularity and success can be attributed to a variety of sources including its 
neutrality, speed, cost, con& dentiality, ability to select an expert adjudicator 
and the ease of enforcement under the New York Convention for the 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.33
In the public international context, arbitration has also found fertile ground. It 
has caused politicians such as Benjamin Franklin to remark “When will 
mankind be convinced and agree to settle their di#  culties by arbitration?”34 
and motivated William Jennings Bryan to attempt to prevent World War I by 
promoting treaties to foster the resolution of disputes by arbitration.35 In the 
investment context, treaties such as the Jay Treaty (1794)36 and Treaty of 
30 Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Construction of Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press: 1996) [Hereina$ er Dezalay and 
Garth 1996]; Laura J. Cooper, “! e Process of Process: ! e Historical Development of Procedure in Labor 
Arbitration,” in Arbitration 2005: ! e Evolving World of Work, Proceedings of the Fi$ y-Eighth Annual 
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, Bureau of National A" airs, vol. 99 (2006).
31 David J. Bederman, International Law Frameworks (Foundation Press: 2001), p. 238.
32 Dezalay and Garth 1996; Catherine Rogers, “Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of 
Conduct for International Arbitration,” 23 M'81. J. I(/’4 L. 347, 353 (2002) [Hereina$ er Rogers 2002].
33 Jan Paulsson, “Dispute Resolution,” in Robert Pritchard, ed., Economic Development, Foreign Investment, 
and the Law (Kluwer: 1996), pp. 211–212 [Hereina$ er Paulsson 1996].
34 Brainy Quotes (http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/benjaminfr169230.html).
35 Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: ! e Life of William Jennings Bryan (Knopf: 2006).
36 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.–Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 116 [hereina$ er Jay 
Treaty].
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Ghent (1814) began using arbitration for resolving investment-related 
disputes by giving creditors access to an international commission to press 
their claims. Article VI of the Jay Treaty, for example, provided British 
creditors with the right to adjudicate claims for compensation; and Article VII 
granted U.S. creditors similar rights against the British government.37
Where tribunals adhered to articulated rules and engaged in reasoned legal 
analysis, arbitration tended to be successful. Cases such as the Alabama Claims 
case, which involved Britain’s responsibilities as a neutral during the U.S. Civil 
War, marked a watershed in the development of international arbitration. % e 
U.S. and British governments established a & ve-member tribunal composed of 
nationals from the U.S., Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Brazil. Following a strict 
juridical procedure and the parties’ agreed lex specialis, the tribunal issued a 
reasoned award against Britain, which was paid.38 Nevertheless, where early 
“arbitrations” were not pure applications of the rule of law but a blend of 
juridical and diplomatic considerations, there were concerns that arbitration 
was an extension of gunboat diplomacy and/or imperialism.39
b. ! e Status Quo for Resolving Disputes
At present, treaties are individually negotiated between and among sovereign 
governments. Without a multilateral agreement on investment, there is no 
uniform treatment of dispute resolution methods in investment treaties.40 
Although there are exceptions, there does appear to be a general trend, 
however. In particular, the resolution of investor-State treaty claims occurs 
primarily through some type of non-binding dispute resolution and/or 
arbitration. State-to-State dispute resolution exhibits a similar pattern.41
37 Merrills, however, has suggested that this was not arbitration in its modern conception. Rather, it was 
“supposed to blend juridical with diplomatic considerations to produce (in e" ect) a negotiated 
settlement.” (Merrills 2005, p. 92).
38 Id., pp. 94, 105.
39 Id., pp. 92–93; Bederman 2001, p. 238; Barton Legum, “% e Innovation of Investor-State Arbitration 
under NAFTA,” 43 H+,*. I(/’4 L.J. 531, 534–535 (2002) [Hereina$ er Legum 2002].
40 Scholarship in related to dispute resolution design could bene& t from an empirical analysis of the most 
common dispute resolution systems (and most prominent exceptions) provided in BITs. It is, however, 
very di#  cult to analyze these matters. See, e.g., Jason W. Yackee, Conceptual Di$  culties in the Empirical 
Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties (May 2006) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=903680). Nevertheless, this chapter relies upon publicly available discussions about the content and 
scope of dispute resolution provisions.
41 At present, investment treaties contain a unique combination of both State-to-State dispute resolution and 
investor-State dispute resolution (Franck 2005b). While this chapter focuses primarily on investor-State
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In the investor-State context, BITs generally call for the “amicable resolution” 
of disputes. Commentators suggest that this provision is intended to refer to 
the use of non-binding dispute resolution mechanisms such as negotiation, 
mediation or conciliation to resolve disputes.42 NAFTA is slightly more 
precise, requiring that “disputing parties should & rst attempt to settle a claim 
through consultation or negotiation.”43 Nevertheless, while the ambiguity may 
have been intended to preserve ! exibility and the informality of the dispute 
resolution process, the lack of guidance creates di#  culties. % e meaning of 
these obligations is not explained; particularly for legal cultures with di" erent 
dispute resolution traditions, it fails to articulate mutual expectations about 
how the parties should begin to attempt to resolve their dispute. Moreover, 
there are no mandates particularizing what the process should entail and how it 
should be accomplished. % is lack of a clear consent to procedural parameters 
and the lack of substantive obligations leave the “amiable resolution” 
methodology with little force. It is unclear what e" ect these provisions have 
had on the resolution of investment disputes.
Irrespective of whether this unparticularized form of dispute resolution is 
required or simply recommended,44 there is usually a time limit on how long 
it must continue. Treaties generally require, for example, that a$ er submitting 
a notice of dispute investors wait three or six months before & ling an o#  cial 
request for arbitration. % is suggests the waiting period is primarily intended 
to provide more of a “cooling o" ” period to permit parties to gather resources 
and develop an internal strategy for dispute resolution prior to the commence-
ment of adjudication. By way of example, Schreuer observed that Article 11 of 
the German model BIT provides “Divergencies [sic] concerning investments … 
should as far as possible be settled amicably …. If the divergency cannot be 
arbitration, to complete a thorough analysis of the system, both aspects of the system deserve serious and 
individual consideration. (United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations 1988, pp. 66–70; 
UNCTAD 1998, pp. 92–96; Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus 
Nihjo"  Publishers: 1994) [Hereina$ er Dolzer and Stevens 1994], pp. 119–120; “Dispute Settlement: 
General Topics, Dispute Settlement: Investor-State,” UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/30 (2005). (http://www.unctad.
org/en/docs/iteiit30_en.pdf) [Hereina$ er UNCTAD 2003b], pp. 12–14.
42 Noah Rubins, “Comments to Jack C. Coe, Jr.’s Article on Conciliation,” 21(4) M)+47’3 I(/’4 A,9. R):. 21 
(2006) [Hereina$ er Rubins 2006]; Schreuer 2004.
43 NAFTA Art. 1118.
44 Generally, BITs do not require mandatory non-binding dispute resolution, such as conciliation or 
mediation. Where conciliation is present, it may be o" ered under established procedures (such as the 
UNCITRAL, ICSID Conciliation Rules or ICSID Additional Facility Conciliation Rules). Particularly in 
investor-State disputes, it is typically an option o" ered either prior to or instead of arbitration 
(Rubins 2006).
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settled within six months of the date when it has been raised by one of the 
parties in dispute, it shall … be submitted for arbitration.”45
Beyond the question of whether or not BITs provide for non-particularized 
“amicable settlement” or conciliation, most BITs do provide that arbitration is 
the & nal method for resolving treaty-based claims. Given the textual preva-
lence of arbitration provisions in BITs—and the absence of less systematic reli-
ance on other forms of dispute resolution—it appears that arbitration has 
historically been the presumed “best” mechanism for resolving investment 
disputes.46 % ere has, unfortunately, been little (if any) systematic or empirical 
enquiry into whether this assumption is correct—and whether that 
assumption is equally applicable to investor-State and State-to-State dispute 
resolution. It is, for example, generally unclear whether dra$ ers of model 
BITs or individual treaties analyzed the utility of “cooling o" ” periods, or 
whether arbitration is the appropriate default dispute resolution mechanism.47 
(See Annex 8, Novel Features in OECD Countries’ Recent Investment 
Agreements.)
c. Understanding the Choice for Arbitration
In explaining the shi$  toward arbitration and the judicialization of treaty 
disputes, some suggest the phenomenon occurred because an “increasing 
number of capital importing countries came to realize that their self-interest 
was served by agreeing to arbitrate investment disputes.”48 % ere has, however, 
been little explanation or documentation of this phenomenon or why arbitra-
tion might also be in the interest of capital exporting countries. Moreover, 
there has not been a coherent explanation of why other dispute resolution 
systems were less desirable.
During the initial phase of BIT negotiation during the late 1950s and 1960s, 
there does not appear to have been a systematic analysis of why arbitration 
might be preferable to other dispute resolution options—either binding or 
45 Schreuer 2004, p. 232.
46 Dolzer and Stevens 1994, pp. 119–122, 129–136.
47 % e Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, which did provide for State-to-State dispute 
resolution but failed to provide investors with a direct right to arbitrate disputes, is a notable exception to 
this general trend (Dodge 2006).
48 Alvarez and Park 2003, pp. 366–368.
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non-binding.49 % us, an over-reliance on arbitration is hardly surprising. % e 
“alternative dispute resolution revolution” did not start in the United 
States until the late 1970s and did not gain signi& cant prominence until the 
1980s and 1990s; and the dispute systems design movement was in its 
infancy during the late 1980s and early 1990s.50 It has taken even longer for the 
bene& ts of alternative dispute resolution and dispute resolution design to & nd 
a home across the Atlantic.51 It is curious, however, that even during the 
surge of treaty dra$ ing during the 1990s—a$ er these two movements had 
gained signi& cant ground—there was little (if any) consideration for why 
arbitration was still the preferred—let alone appropriate—method for 
resolving disputes.
% ere are undoubtedly a variety of explanations for this phenomenon. First, as 
the system of resolving investment treaty claims remained relatively untested 
during this time, there was little need to re-evaluate the status quo. In other 
words, changes were unnecessary as there was no visible evidence of dysfunction. 
Second, as countries continued to dra$  model BITs and negotiate BITs on that 
basis, there was likely institutional momentum to stick to the traditionally 
approved format. Revisions or re-negotiation would require explanations at 
various levels of government. Expending energy to make changes may not 
have been worth the e" ort, particularly where treaties appeared to pro" er the 
promised rewards—namely foreign investment—and the disuse of the arbitra-
tion system meant there were minimal costs. % ird, practical considerations 
may have played a role. Although the business community may have started to 
use interest-based mechanisms to resolve business to business disputes, they 
may have been unwilling to endorse interest-based dispute resolution models 
in the investor-State context without evidence of their successful implementa-
tion. Similarly, to the extent that non-binding, interest-based dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms like mediation and negotiation might exclude the public, 
non-governmental organizations may not have been interested in advocating 
for these dispute resolution processes.
Perhaps more importantly, treaty dra$ ers may have used arbitration because it 
was associated with tried and tested institutions. It was seen as working well 
49 UNCTAD 1998; Dolzer and Stevens 1994.
50 Jean R. Sternlight, “ADR is Here: Preliminary Re! ections on Where it Fits in a System of Justice,” 
3 N)*. L. J. 289 (2003) [Hereina$ er Sternlight 2003].
51 David J.A. Cairns, “Mediating International Commercial Disputes: Di" erences in U.S. and European 
Approaches,” 60 O8/. D'3:. R)3.4. J. 62 (2005) [Hereina$ er Cairns 2005]; Vicuña 2001.
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and had the patina of international legitimacy. % omas Franck52 has explained 
that international institutions can become legitimate by a#  liating with the 
proven institutions of international law’s past.53 % e Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal 
was able to resolve disputes between foreign investors and host governments 
using a process that adhered to the rule of law and—with one exception54—did 
not require stakeholders to resort to physical violence to settle complaints.55 
Meanwhile, the ICSID Convention created an institution designed to resolve 
disputes through arbitration. More importantly, international commercial 
arbitration was gaining steam with success of the New York Convention 
and many countries adopting progressive arbitration laws based upon the 
1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 
Arbitration seemed to be working. In contrast to cases resolved at the 
International Court of Justice,56 investment disputes were getting resolved 
e#  ciently. Sophisticated counsel was available to make e" ective arguments. 
Parties were complying with awards, and streamlined enforcement mecha-
nisms were readily available. In these circumstances, it was not unreasonable 
to desire the continuation of a process that appeared to have some success in 
achieving practical results.
Beyond the institutional legitimacy, there are practical reasons that arbitration 
was seen as e" ective. International commercial arbitration has certain systematic 
e#  ciencies in its model that could be gra$ ed onto the investment treaty model. 
For instance, the neutrality of international arbitration permits the independent 
and impartial resolution of disputes. It escapes the perception of unfair local 
advantage or outright partiality of the court system in favor of the host 
government. In addition, rather than engaging in lengthy litigation before a 
national or international court, arbitration was presumed to save time, money 
and other internal resources. Although they outsource authority to resolve 
the dispute, parties retain a degree of control over the process of resolving 
52 % e author of this essay is unrelated to Professor Franck.
53 % omas M. Franck, ! e Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press: 1990).
54 Memorandum Re: Challenge to Arbitrators Kashani and Shafeifei by the Government of the United States 
of America, 7 I,+( U.S.-C4. T,'9. R):. 281, 292 (1986). One Iranian judge was quoted as saying: “If 
Mangard ever dares to enter the tribunal chamber again, either his corpse or my corpse will leave it rolling 
down the stairs.” Iranian Judge ! reatens A Swede at ! e Hague, N.Y. T'2)3, Sept. 7, 1984, at A5. 
Subsequently, the Tribunal’s President suspended all tribunal proceedings. U.S.–Iran Arbitration Suspended 
at ! e Hague, N.Y. T'2)3, Sept. 20, 1984, at A9.
55 Charles N. Brower, ! e Iran– United States Claims Tribunal (Springer: 1998).
56 See generally F. A. Mann, “Foreign Investment in the International Court of Justice: the ELSI Case,” 
86 A2. J. I(/’4 L. 92 (1992); Case Concerning Eletronica Sicula, S.p.A (ELSI), United States of America 
v. Italy, 1989, I.C.J. Reports 4.
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the con! ict. Not only can they select their decision-makers, but they can also 
tailor the arbitration process to meet their needs and the peculiarities of a 
speci& c investment dispute. % ere were other unique aspects of arbitration 
that made it a desirable alternative to litigation before national or international 
courts. In particular, arbitration was con& dential and would permit parties to 
preserve sensitive commercial data, prevent adverse publicity and preserve 
ongoing relationships. Arbitration also had a streamlined enforcement 
mechanism, which made it preferable to having to enforce a judgment through 
the U.N. Security Council or needing to engage in time-consuming national 
court litigation to enforce foreign court judgments.57 Ultimately, investment 
treaty arbitration has been seen to resolve disputes and, a$ er exhausting 
contested awards through the normal legal process, parties have generally 
paid awards.
Nevertheless, one wonders whether a di" erent dispute resolution system 
would be more e#  cient, e" ective and better address concerns of stakeholders. 
It would, however, be imprudent to presume a di" erent system would be superior 
to the current framework without a diagnosis of the system, consideration of 
the dispute design and an assessment of the costs and bene& ts. % e implications 
are not insigni& cant. While there have been concerns about transparency, 
consistency, fairness and regulatory authority, choosing a di" erent system for 
resolving disputes may ameliorate the problems or perhaps simply lead the 
issues to manifest themselves in a di" erent fashion. % e goal should be to 
purify the waters of investment-related con! ict rather than contaminating the 
water supply.
% e use of dispute systems design to diagnose and assess the current system’s 
dispute resolution needs may be one way to begin this process. Future work 
can and should consider the speci& c application of dispute systems design for 
the resolution of investment treaty con! ict. It might, for example, consider 
how to do a con! ict assessment, analyze existing patterns of disputing and 
consider what are the appropriate principles upon which a system should be 
based.58 In connection with this, this chapter turns to a systematic consideration 
of di" erent options for resolving investment treaty con! ict and how they are 
used (if at all) to manage con! ict e" ectively.
57 Recently, however, there has been concern as to the enforceability of investment treaty awards, 
particularly in the context of the claims against Argentina; see, e.g., Osvaldo J. Marzoti, “Enforcement of 
Treaty Awards and National Constitutions (the Argentinean Cases),” 7 B53. L. I(/’4 226 (2006).
58 Franck 2007.
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! e Range of Options: Appropriate Dispute Resolution and
the Dispute Resolution Continuum
It is essential to place the resolution of investment disputes in its wider 
context. “% e settlement of any dispute, not just investment disputes, requires 
the adoption of the most speedy, informal, amicable and inexpensive method 
available.”59 Finding the most “appropriate” mechanism for resolving speci& c 
categories of types of investment disputes, however, can be challenging. 
Nevertheless, there are decided bene& ts to tailoring a design to the unique 
needs of the particular system. % ese bene& ts might include the promotion of 
democratic values, minimizing resources exerted on dispute resolution, 
increasing productivity, increasing satisfaction with outcomes, decreasing the 
recurrence of disputes and improving public relations.60 Finding the appropriate 
dispute resolution is therefore a matter of some importance.
Historically, the term “ADR” has been viewed as “alternative dispute resolu-
tion.” % ere has, unfortunately, been confusion about what that term means. 
In a domestic context, “alternative dispute resolution” has tended to mean any 
dispute resolution process that occurs outside national courts; but because of 
its prevalence in the international context, there has been some debate as to 
whether arbitration was truly “alternative” dispute resolution.61 While this is 
an interesting intellectual debate, it is a distraction from the fundamental need 
to provide for the appropriate and e" ective resolution of investment disputes. 
% erefore, for present purposes, “ADR” is de& ned as an appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanism. In an e" ort to facilitate the creation of a dispute 
resolution system that functions e" ectively and meets systemic needs for 
managing con! ict, the purpose of this section is to consider the spectrum of 
mechanisms—whether non-binding, binding or hybrids—that are available to 
stakeholders for resolving investment disputes.
Beyond the problem of de& ning ADR, there is also a confusion that persists in 
many jurisdictions and di" erent cultures as to the meaning of speci& c ADR 
alternatives. % is lack of a common understanding and mutual expectations 
59 UNCTAD 2003b, p. 11.
60 Richard C. Reuben, “Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace,” 10 
H+,*. N)-./. L. R)*. 11 (2005) [Hereina$ er Rueben 2005]; CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, 
Resource Book For Managing Employment Disputes (2004); Ury et al. 1998.
61 Paulsson 1996, p. 210; Vicuña 2001; Ucheora Onwuamaegbu, “% e Role of ADR in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: % e ICSID Experience,” 2(2) News from ICSID, 12 (2005) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/
news/news_22–2.pdf) [Hereina$ er Onwuamaegbu 2005].
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has signi& cant implications.62 For example, Amy Cohen eloquently explains: 
“Mediation changes as it travels; its instantiation anywhere is subject to local 
variation and intervention as it makes contact with state and customary law, 
politics, and social struggles.”63 Given di" erent cultural understandings and 
the potential for mismatched expectations at a sensitive juncture in the 
dispute resolution process, it is vital to create a common lexicon. Establishing 
this framework will assist in framing future analysis and debate, foster an 
appreciation for variations in the approaches and permit stakeholders to make 
informed choices.
% eoretically, there are a variety of options for resolving investment treated 
disputes. % e classic formulation in dispute resolution circles is that the “forum 
[should] & t the fuss.”64 In order to make an informed choice of the appropriate 
of the design of a dispute resolution system, it is useful to consider the options 
along the dispute resolution continuum that might be employed individually 
or in combination to resolve investment-related disputes. Once the spectrum 
of choices is clear, designing dispute systems is more e#  cient.65
Stressing that “arbitration is only one of many ADR choices,” Costantino and 
Merchant identify six broad categories of ADR options: preventative, negoti-
ated, facilitative, fact-& nding, advisory and imposed ADR.66 Each category 
involves varying levels of third-party intervention, with their own distinct 
costs and bene& ts; and each category can be implemented at di" erent 
junctures. In an e" ort to create a common framework for discussing ADR in 
the context of investment law, this chapter adopts Costantino and Merchant’s 
categories for understanding ADR mechanisms.67 % e breadth and generality of 
the categories promote understanding of the primary nature of the mechanism 
without being hindered by the particularities of the distinct mechanisms 
within the categories. Once the fundamental character of the process is de& ned, 
62 Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Houghton Mi;  in 
Company: 1981), p. 34.
63 Amy J. Cohen, “Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in Nepal,” 
11 H+,*. N)-./. L. R)*. 295, 296 (2006).
64 Frank E.A. Sander and Stephen Goldberg, “Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to 
Selecting an ADR Procedure,” 10 N)-./. J. 49 (1994) [Hereina$ er Sander and Goldberg 1994].
65 Costantino and Merchant 1996; Ury et al. 1988.
66 Costantino and Merchant 1996, pp. 37–41.
67 In Ury et al.’s conception of interest, rights and power-based dispute design system, the & rst & ve methods 
are likely to be more interest-based and Imposed ADR is likely to involve rights-based adjudication. 
Power-based resolution, as previously de& ned, can take the form of war, violence, strikes, or physical 
aggression (Ury et al. 1988).
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it then identi& es primary dispute resolution processes in the category. % e 
description of the various processes is by no means exhaustive. While there 
will be variations and permutations, articulating the common framework—
and beginning to assess the costs and bene& ts of its elements—is a useful place 
from which to start.
Preventative ADR
Preventative ADR mechanisms are designed to preempt disputes. Recognizing 
that con! ict is an inevitable aspect of human interactions, preventative ADR 
methods do not try to stop con! ict from arising; rather they channel potential 
areas of disagreements into a problem-solving arena in order to avoid the 
crystallization and escalation of disputes. In the context of investment 
disputes, this might take various forms, such as negotiated rule making, the 
use of good o#  ces to engage in peer-review of the dispute or the use of an 
ombudsperson.68
a. ! e Benefi ts of Negotiated Rulemaking and Good O"  ces
Encouraging host country governments to participate in negotiated rulemaking 
in domestic administrative law can mitigate potential international law 
con! icts at the outset rather than waiting until the harmful e" ects of the 
regulation are apparent. % ere is a rich literature considering the value of 
negotiated rule making in the United States.69 Undoubtedly, there would be 
up-front costs related to the process of creating consensus, selecting the right 
types of areas for negotiated rulemaking and addressing concerns about degree 
of public participation. Nevertheless, proactively using negotiated rulemaking 
to prevent disputes could have signi& cant bene& ts. For instance, it could lead 
to: the prevention of subsequent disputes, the modeling good government, an 
improvement in the quality of government regulation, the promotion of 
democratic values and the enhancement of governmental legitimacy.70
68 % ere are also other forms of preventative ADR partnering and joint problem solving. % ese, however, 
may work best in a more commercial context.
69 Cary Conglianese, “Assessing Consensus: % e Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking,” 
46 D5<) L.J. 1255 (1997) [Hereina$ er Conglianese 1997]; Lawrence Susskind and Gerard McMahon, 
“% e % eory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking,” 3 Y+4) J. .( R)-. 133 (1985) [Hereina$ er Susskind 
and McMahon 1985].
70 Jody Freeman and Laura I. Langbein, “Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Bene& t,” 9 N.Y.U. 
E(*/4 L.J. 60 (2000) [Hereina$ er Freeman and Langbein 2000].
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Likewise, using “good o#  ces” might have merit. In this instance, a person in a 
position of authority and prestige could facilitate communications between 
the parties and provide peer-review to prevent disputes from arising or 
escalating.71 Although such preventive diplomacy has achieved mixed results 
in the public international law context, it remains a potential tool in the 
toolbox for governments seeking to maximize the utility of the design of their 
dispute resolution system. UNCTAD has referenced the possibility of using 
“good o#  ces,” although it has not analyzed the issue systematically.72 
Interestingly, UNCTAD appears to view “good o#  ces” as a step to be taken 
only a$ er negotiated ADR mechanisms fail; but this should not prevent it from 
being used as a preventative mechanism to check the escalation of disputes 
and improve communication ex ante.
b. Opportunities with Ombuds
Ombuds might also be used to manage con! ict and prevent the escalation of 
disputes. Ombuds have their roots in China, Egypt and Germanic tribes, but 
were used most prominently in connection with democratic governance in 
Sweden, where they provided a bridge between private individuals and the 
government. More recently, ombuds have been used successfully in the 
United Kingdom, United States and the European Union, as well as in 
corporate contexts.73
An ombudsperson is an o#  cial, appointed either by a public or private 
institution, whose fundamental function is to remain impartial and receive 
complaints and questions from a de& ned constituency about issues within the 
ombuds’ express jurisdiction. % e ombuds’ mandate is to resolve complaints at 
an early stage. To carry out this method, ombudspersons have many tools. 
% ey might direct constituents to other processes or opportunities that may 
resolve the issues, or, they may raise the problem at an appropriate level within 
the organization.74 In its classic de& nition, the ombudsperson is an “o#  cer 
appointed by the legislature to handle complaints against administrative and 
71 Linda C. Reif, “Conciliation as a Mechanism for the Resolution of International Economic and Business 
Disputes,” 14 F.,01+2 I(/’4 L.J. 578 (1991) [Hereina$ er Reif 1991]; Bederman 2001, p. 236.
72 UNCTAD 2003b, pp. 11–12.
73 Harold J. Krent, “Federal Agency Ombuds: % e Costs, Bene& ts and Countenance of Con& dentiality,” 52 
A02'(. L. R)*. 17 (2000) [Hereina$ er Krent 2000]; Vicuña 2001; Philip J. Harter, “Ombuds—A Voice for 
the People,” D'3:. R)3.4. M+-. (Winter 2005), p. 5 [Hereina$ er Harter 2005].
74 Ombuds may also have authority to mediate disputes. By and large, they resolve con! ict through a hybrid 
process of investigation and conciliation in order to prevent the escalation of disputes.
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judicial action,” serving as a watchdog over those actions while exercising 
independence, expertise, impartiality, accessibility, and powers of persuasion 
rather than control.75 While they generally lack the power to make binding 
decisions, order administrative conduct or reverse administrative action, their 
capacity to make recommendations and to publicize their & ndings has an 
impact. An ombudsperson’s “authority and in! uence derive from the fact that 
he is appointed by and reports to one of the principal organs of state, usually 
either the parliament or the chief executive.”76 Ultimately, an ombudpersons’ 
mandate is not to protect the organization’s reputation. Rather, his or her 
objective is to promote reasoned, fair and ethical conduct in the organization 
and to take a view based upon integrity, legality and principle.77
% e use of ombuds has a level of built-in acceptance and con& dence in both 
the governmental and the corporate context. % ey & rst have the bene& t of 
history and a legacy of authority. Because ombuds are associated with a practice 
that has a long, multi-cultural tradition that has been e" ective in many 
contexts, this pedigree promotes symbolic validation, which lends the process 
legitimacy.78 Ombuds o#  ces have the bene& t of equality, where those who are 
a" ected by a con! ict have a place to give voice to their concerns. Unlike an 
investor’s unilateral right to bring claims under a treaty, investors, citizens and 
governmental o#  cials could have theoretical access to the ombuds o#  ce for 
the & ling of complaints.79
Beyond these more theoretical bene& ts, there are also practical bene& ts of 
using ombudspersons to prevent disputes. For parties with investment-related 
concerns, an ombuds o#  ce o" ers a clear line of authority for receiving com-
plaints and lowers the cost of raising issues. % is has the bene& t of permitting 
smaller investors or parties with smaller con! icts to have their concerns heard 
and addressed. In essence, it facilitates access to justice and decreases the 
stigma of announcing and quickly resolving disputes. While theoretically it 
could increase the number of recorded disputes, presumably this would not 
mean the number of disputes actually increased but, rather, there would be an 
increase in reporting problems. Commentators have noted that “submitting 
an investment dispute to arbitration under a treaty can decrease the chances of 
75 Shirley A. Wiegland, “A Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model,” 
12 O1'. S/. J. .( D'3:. R)3.4. 95, 96 (1996) [Hereina$ er Wiegland 1996].
76 Krent 2000.
77 Wiegland 1996.
78 Franck 1990, pp. 91–110.
79 Wiegland 1996.
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amicable resolution of the dispute because settlement of a treaty claim requires 
approval of additional decision-makers in the government and therefore 
complicates any resolution.”80 Ombuds are a natural antidote to this. Rather 
than letting problems fester and reach the boiling point, an ombudsperson 
provides an early opportunity to intervene and improve the situation. In other 
words, there is a formal process that allows parties to address issues informally 
before ratcheting up the costs and formality of con! ict resolution.
As there is o$ en too little information and problems with disbursing the 
available information at the beginning of a con! ict, commentators have 
suggested that the prospects of early settlement are o$ en “dim”—particularly 
when multiple agencies are involved.81 Ombuds, however, could provide an 
antidote to this problem. Because an ombudsperson is an independent part of 
the host country government, the o#  ce would be in a position to know the 
agencies, entities or people whose involvement would be needed to resolve 
matters.
% e requirement, for example in an investment treaty, to establish an ombuds 
o#  ce would require governments to determine in advance who would have
institutional responsibility for resolving investment-based disputes and with
whom ombuds should liaise. Using ombudspersons as an information conduit
would create an opportunity to manage con! icts more e" ectively when they do
arise and minimize the information vacuum in order to clear the way for early
(or easier) dispute resolution. As “the best chance to resolve a dispute between
a foreign investor and a government agency is likely before the investment
dispute becomes a dispute under an investment treaty,”82 ombuds provide a
unique opportunity to catch and resolve con! ict before a dispute is crystallized.
% is is a useful alternative to making a formal claim and dedicating institu-
tional resources to win and/or litigate to the end, irrespective of the cost.
An ombuds o#  ce could also serve as a con! ict barometer. It would alert 
governments to where they are most likely to encounter di#  culties; with that 
information, they would be in a position to make more informed and rational 
80 Barton Legum, “% e Di#  culties of Conciliation on Investment Treaty Cases: A Comment on Professor 
Jack C. Coe’s ‘Towards a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary 
Sketch,’” 21(4) M)+47’3 I(/’4 A,9. R):. 23 (2006) [Hereina$ er Legum 2006]; Jack J. Coe, Jr., “Toward a 
Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes—A Preliminary Sketch,” 12 U.S. D+*'3 J. 
I(/’4 L. +(0 P.4’7 7 (2005) [Hereina$ er Coe 2005].
81 Legum 2006.
82 Legum 2006.
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legislative and regulatory choices. Moreover, ombuds can enhance the image 
and legitimacy of government agencies. While it could not make or change 
policy, the presence of an ombuds o#  ce can encourage government o#  cials to 
support their decisions with su#  cient reasoning. In addition, providing the 
regulated public with a direct form of communication and feedback can 
promote democratic values and institutional legitimacy.83
c. Challenges with Preventative Dispute Resolution
% e same bene& ts, however, could create problems for governments, investors 
and other interested parties. All of these types of Preventative ADR will share 
common di#  culties. Because they are not as frequently used, parties may be 
hesitant to try them. In the case of negotiated rulemaking or good o#  ces, 
stakeholders may be unwilling to consider these options until a “mutually 
hurting stalemate” exists. In other words, until the di#  culties with the existing 
system reach a point that is unbearable for all stakeholders, the system may 
not be ripe for the use of these options.84
Similarly, governments may be unfamiliar with the process of using ombuds-
persons. Some governments may & nd it alien and undesirable. Beyond the 
inertia of continuing with the status quo, governments may be unwilling to 
expend the resources necessary to create such an o#  ce. % ey may believe, for 
example, that there are an insu#  cient number of investment-related con! icts 
to justify the establishment of an o#  ce. Moreover, the creation of an ombuds 
o#  ce would front-load the process of managing disputes by requiring the
creation of structures. Should governments fail to see the down-stream,
long-term bene& ts of the creation of an ombuds o#  ce, they may decide the
cost is not worth the bene& t.
% ere may also be other di#  culties. As ombudspersons’ persuasive authority 
comes from autonomy, expertise, neutrality and status, the o#  ce’s e" ectiveness 
can be diminished when any of these essential characters are lacking or impaired. 
Should an ombuds’ a#  liation with the government be perceived to compromise 
independence, people may be less willing to seek his or her assistance. 
83 Krent 2000.
84 Andrea Schneider, “% e Day A$ er Tomorrow: What Happens Once A Middle East Peace Treaty Is 
Signed?” 6 N)*. L.J. 401 (2006); I. William Zartman, “Timing and Ripeness,” in Andrea Kupfer Schneider 
and Christopher Honeyman, eds., ! e Negotiator’s Fieldbook: ! e Desk Reference For ! e Experienced 
Negotiator (ABA Section of Dispute Resolution: 2006).
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Ombuds should not be a mouthpiece of the government that institutionalizes 
the status quo while ignoring the concerns of other stakeholders.85 In the past, 
this has been one of the primary obstacles to using ombuds e" ectively.86 To 
ensure proper neutrality and the ability to perform their core functions, any 
ombuds o#  ce would need physical as well as & scal independence from any 
one constituency to minimize the appearance of bias.87
% ere may also be challenges related to con& dentiality. % ere are disagreements 
about whether communications to ombuds are privileged and whether con& -
dentiality is appropriate. Certain stakeholders may assert that the transparency 
of the ombuds process is critical to promote settlements that are in the public 
interest. Meanwhile, other stakeholders might suggest con& dentiality is funda-
mental to an e" ective process. A lack of con& dentiality may create di#  culties in 
maintaining the perception of an ombud’s neutrality; and it may also inhibit the 
full and frank disclosure of problems, which might chill the use of the ombuds 
and frustrate a primary reason for its creation. One can imagine an investor with 
a long-term regulatory relationship with a government who would be concerned 
about government reprisals for the reporting of problems.88
% ese possible concerns are not trivial. Consideration should be given to ways 
to address and neutralize these concerns to strike an appropriate balance. 
Although the devil would undoubtedly be in the details, the promise of an 
ombuds o#  ce should not be overlooked. % e ! exibility, distinct capacities and 
institutional position provides a unique opportunity to constructively resolve 
con! ict. Ultimately, these preventative ADR methods hold the important 
promise of preventing disputes from crystallizing and allowing parties to 
allocate their resources e" ectively.
Negotiated ADR
Negotiated ADR involves communications between the parties to a con! ict; 
the result of such discussions will be either to create a mutually acceptable 
resolution or terminate the process, presumably to pursue other ADR methods. 
85 Wiegland 1996.
86 Id.
87 If an ombud serves at the whim of a government with little job security, for example, he or she may be 
tempted to forgo well-deserved criticism of administrative actions.
88 Krent 2000.
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All negotiations are not the same, however. Even if one agrees to negotiate, 
parties can use di" erent approaches to negotiation, which creates variations in 
the negotiation process. Parties tend to adversarial bargaining,89 interest-based 
bargaining,90 or a combination of these approaches91 during the negotiation 
process. In adversarial bargaining, parties focus on legal rights, tactical posi-
tions, gaming the process, and the use of power to distribute limited resources. 
Typically, this means a party will make extreme o" ers, o" er few concessions, 
make threats, and distort information in an e" ort to be the “winner” in what 
is typically a win-lose scenario.92 In the interest-based approach, parties focus 
on meeting their underlying needs and objectives in order to create joint solu-
tions that fairly address their mutual interests. % is approach tends to require 
parties to separate people from the problem, focus on underlying interests, 
generating a variety of options before deciding what to do, and making deci-
sions based upon objective criteria.93
Irrespective of their theoretical approach, in the context of investment 
disputes parties might use di" erent types of negotiated ADR. % e parties to the 
dispute may use, for example, either direct or indirect forms of negotiation.
a. ! e Utility of Indirect Negotiation
Diplomacy is a form of indirect negotiation. In this process, investors might 
encourage their home government to engage in private diplomatic discussions 
with the host country to resolve their underlying complaints about host 
government behavior. % ese government-to-government negotiations may 
increase investors’ leverage. Having their home government to advocate on 
their behalf brings political clout to the dispute resolution table and emphasizes 
89 % is process has also been referred to in the literature as distributional or positional bargaining (Carrie J. 
Menkel-Meadow, Lela Porter Love and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Mediation: Practice, Policy and Ethics 
(2006) [Hereina$ er Menkel-Meadow et al. 2006], pp. 39–51).
90 % is process is also referred to as problem-solving, integrative bargaining or principled bargaining; Id.
91 % ere is a broad literature on negotiation style. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Bargaining for Advantage: 
Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People (Penguin: 1999); Martin A. Rogo" , “% e Obligation to 
Negotiate in International Law: Rules and Realities,” 16 M'81. J. I(/’4 L. 141 (1994) [Hereina$ er Rogo"  
1994]; Chris Guthrie, “Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: % e Cost of Options in Negotiation,” 88 I.=+ L. R)*. 
601 (2003) [Hereina$ er Guthrie 2003]. As a thorough discussion of this important point is beyond the 
scope of this project, this chapter only provides a cursory overview of the literature.
92 Russell Korobkin, “A Positive % eory of Legal Negotiation,” 88 G).. L.J. 1789 (2000) [Hereina$ er 
Korobkin 2000].
93 Fisher and Ury 1981; Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, “Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: % e 
Structure of Problem Solving,” 31 UCLA L. R)*. 754 (1984) [Hereina$ er Menkel-Meadow 1984].
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the importance of the claim. Such an approach may also expand the range of 
potential solutions by introducing the resources of another party into the dispute 
resolution process. Nevertheless, there are drawbacks. First, an investor’s home 
government may have little interest in pursuing an investor’s claim; and investors 
will have expended resources for a minimal return. Between 1960 and 1974, for 
example, the United Nations identi& ed 875 distinct governmental takings of 
foreign property in 62 countries, but it unclear whether investors’ home govern-
ments ever pursued these claims.94 Second, should a government decide to 
espouse an investor’s claim, investors run the risk of having their disputes inextri-
cably intertwined with larger inter-governmental objectives. As a result, little may 
come from the negotiation. % ird, even if negotiations prove successful, investors 
may & nd themselves subject to a unsatisfactory resolution over which they had 
little input or control and which does not address their needs. Fourth, there may 
be di#  culties with enforcement of any diplomatic agreement.
b. ! e Benefi ts of Direct Negotiation
An investor also might engage in direct negotiations with a host country 
government. % is option gives more direct control over the process, manage-
ment and result of the dispute resolution process. It also provides an opportu-
nity to create a solution that is most likely to address the parties’ unique needs 
and interests. Investors and the host country government may & nd negotiation 
useful in the case of infrastructure projects, in which protracted dispute resolu-
tion may create alienation in a critical on-going relationship; or where there is 
a desire to minimize the time and cost allocated to resolving small con! icts.
In the context of disputes being resolved primarily by arbitration, there is some 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that parties have used direct negotiations 
successfully. ICSID’s website suggests that several ICSID cases concluded with 
settlement agreements. Some of these are BIT claims, such as AES Summit 
Generation v. Hungary; and at least two BIT-based claims, Lemire v. Ukraine 
and Goetz v. Burundi, have awards embodying settlement agreements.95 
Interestingly, several of these cases have resulted in settlement a$ er a 
jurisdictional decision.96 Meanwhile, counsel for ICSID has also noted that 
94 Jeswald W. Salacuse, “BIT by BIT: % e Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and % eir Impact on Foreign 
Investment in Developing Countries,” 24 I(/’4 L+=. 655, 659 (1990) [Hereina$ er Salacuse 1990].
95 ICSID List of Pending and Concluded Cases 2006 (http://www.icsid.org).
96 ICSID does not have a publicly available list of investment treaty cases that have resulted in settlement. 
A cursory analysis of ICSID’s website and other publicly available awards, however, indicates that, a$ er a 
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there are an “increasing percentage of ICSID [arbitration] cases that are dis-
continued following settlement.”97 % ere have also been negotiated settlements 
in the context of ad hoc arbitration, such as in Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, which 
also settled a$ er a jurisdictional award.98
While this anecdotal evidence suggests negotiation has some promise for 
resolving investment treaty con! ict, there are several limitations. First, there is 
little empirical evidence systematically analyzing the role that direct or indirect 
negotiation plays in the resolution of investment disputes. It is therefore 
unclear to what extent this anecdotal information is generalizable to a larger 
population of investment disputes. Indeed, there may be a sample bias. % ose 
cases settling a$ er the invocation of the ICSID arbitration mechanism may be 
systematically di" erent than those negotiated settlements arising in di" erent 
contexts. Likewise, because investment disputes are con& dential (either 
because they are not registered through the ICSID system or have not yet 
escalated to become public knowledge), there may be fundamental variances 
between con& dential settlements and those cases for which there is public 
information. Second, although it is clear that some cases are settling, the 
con& dential nature of the settlement means that it is impossible to analyze 
how the negotiations occur and what factors a" ect parties’ willingness and 
ability to settle. % ird, because the settlements are con& dential, it is di#  cult to 
evaluate longitudinally compliance with the settlement, parties’ satisfaction 
with the substantive result and the recurrence of later investment-related 
disputes. It would, therefore, be useful to obtain empirical evidence to analyze 
the potential bene& ts of negotiation.
c. ! e Common Challenges for Negotiated ADR
Despite its strengths, negotiated ADR inevitably has certain pitfalls. As a 
non-binding and consensual mechanism, there are challenges related to 
decision on jurisdiction, several BIT-based cases have settled, including: (1) Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, (2) IBM World Trade Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/10, (3) Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, and 
(4) SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13. 
(ICSID List of Pending and Concluded Cases 2006; ICIS List of Online Decisions 2006; Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, Chronological Listing of Awards [as of 11 August 2006] [http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronological_
list.htm]).
97 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
98 Coe 2005, pp. 29–30; ITA Awards 2006.
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securing consent to negotiate, how negotiations occur, the enforceability of 
the agreement and the public nature of the rights.
Obtaining host country government consent to negotiate may prove challenging. 
Particularly where governments are not required to negotiate, host country 
governments might reject or ignore requests for consultation.99 % ere may 
also be di#  culties engaging in negotiation where there is intra-government 
con! ict. Governments may & nd it di#  cult to use negotiation when: (1) the 
government is unaware one of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities 
has engaged in conduct that has led to a dispute, (2) it is unclear what agency 
is responsible for dispute resolution, (3) a responsible agency does not have 
authority to settle the dispute, or (4) there may be no governmental resources 
or funds appropriated to resolve the con! ict. Particularly in a novel, complex 
and inconsistent area like investment treaty law, settling disputes through 
negotiation can be challenging because of the need for a clear record showing 
the facts and the law that justify a settlement.100
Governments may also actively wish to avoid an investor’s approach for 
negotiation when binding, rights-based adjudication is preferable. Parties may 
believe adjudication will produce a substantially better result. Parties may also 
wish to avoid the political fallout for not exhausting all of their legal rights or 
agreeing to settle a politically sensitive dispute. In some cases it may be more 
politically expedient to have a third-party impose a decision, rather than 
having a compromise be seen as a betrayal of national interests.101 Beyond this, 
parties may wish to pursue adjudication initially if is likely to create a more 
favorable opportunities to negotiate a settlement in the future.
% e negotiation process itself contains a series of challenges. Because it is 
non-binding, parties need not pursue negotiation once it starts. Should parties 
use negotiation to manipulate or delay the proceedings in pursuit of other 
objectives, this can complicate the dispute resolution process. Negotiation can 
also be ine" ective if the parties’ positions are far apart and there are few 
common interests to create a zone of possible agreement.102 Particularly for 
parties using adversarial bargaining, the lack of certainty about the parties’ 
legal rights means parties become entrenched in their reasonable beliefs that 
99 Merrills 2005, pp. 23–24.
100 Rubins 2006; Legum 2006.
101 Rubins 2006.
102 Id.
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their case is stronger as a matter of law. % is can translate into a belief that 
compromise is unnecessary, which makes negotiation di#  cult.
% e process can also be complicated by a “stakeholder problem,” where it is 
unclear who must or should be present at the negotiation table. % is can man-
ifest itself in di" erent ways. For example, having inappropriate people involved 
in negotiations can create di#  culties. % ere may be challenges identifying the 
right persons who can negotiate e" ectively on behalf of a government and 
commit the host country government to a settlement.103 % is can create 
challenges when a critical branch of government, a key government 
representative or private entity is absent. Likewise, failure to include other 
critical stakeholders—such as groups directly a" ected by the settlement—may 
create problems. In any of these scenarios, this prevents the forging of a 
consensus; or, even if an agreement is reached, the negotiated solution may 
not properly resolve the underlying dispute. % e end result is that negotiation 
that is not handled properly is the breeding ground for future disputes.
Even if negotiations lead to a settlement, there may still be problems with 
enforcement of settlement agreements. One can only imagine a change in 
government or corporate leadership that leads a party to abandon the settle-
ment agreement—at which point parties may need again to consider the ADR 
implications.
Finally there may also be a category of concerns related to the public nature of 
these rights. Investment treaty rights arise from public international law obli-
gations and tend to implicate public issues.104 Particularly given the state of the 
case law in this area, at least one scholar has articulated a concern that such 
private resolution “is one less reasoned adjudication than might otherwise 
have been available to contribute” to the development of the jurisprudence.105 
Although written in the context of domestic dispute resolution, the work of 
Owen Fiss suggests that any loss of the public adjudication of public rights is 
likely to have an adverse a" ect on adjudicator’s capacity to redress power 
imbalances and trivialize the remedial e" ects of claims designed to redress 
public wrongs. To the extent that more formal and public adjudication are lost, 
it runs the risk of imposing profound social costs.106
103 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
104 Franck 2005b, pp. 70–77.
105 Coe 2006, p. 25.
106 Owen M. Fiss, “Against Settlement,” 93 Y+4) L.J. 1073 (1984) [Hereina$ er Fiss 1984].
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% ere is no doubt that these are important considerations in choosing how to 
resolve disputes, but this does not mean that the bene& ts of negotiation should 
be overlooked. % e opportunity to create tailor-made resolutions in a cost-
e" ective manner is a fundamental attribute. % e goal should be to use dispute 
systems design to help determine if, when and under what circumstances 
should cases be negotiated.107
Facilitated ADR
Like its negotiated ADR counterpart, the goal of facilitated ADR is to harmo-
nize parties’ expectations, re& ne claims, clarify the issues, encourage settle-
ment, and thereby decrease transaction costs, improve satisfaction with the 
result and prevent the recurrence of future disputes. It di" ers, however, in the 
process by which these goals are achieved. Facilitated ADR involves a neutral 
third-party assisting the disputants to reach a satisfactory resolution. % is typ-
ically involves some form of conciliation or mediation. It might also involve 
the use of an ombudsperson.
a. Distinguishing Mediation and Conciliation
In the international context, commentators suggest conciliation and 
mediation are o$ en used interchangeably.108 Doubtless, this is because both 
processes involve a neutral third party assisting the parties to reach a solution 
of their own accord.109 Employing the services of a third-party neutral to 
resolve disputes peacefully is precisely why both mechanisms are a form of 
facilitated ADR.
107 Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, “Whose Dispute Is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of 
Settlement (In Some Cases),” 83 G).. L.J. 2663 (1995) [Hereina$ er Menkel-Meadow 1995].
108 UNCTAD 2003b, p. 21; Coe 2005; Rubins 2006; Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration, 4th Edition (Sweet and Maxwell: 2004). Redfern and Hunter nev-
ertheless suggest at pp. 37–38 that a distinction might be appropriate. % ey note that a mediator “will 
listen to an outline of the dispute and then meet each party separately—o$ en ‘shuttling’ between them—
and try to persuade the parties to moderate their respective positions”. On the other hand, “a conciliator 
was seen as someone who went a step further than the mediator, so to speak, in that the conciliator would 
draw up and propose the terms of an agreement that he or she considered represented a fair settlement.”
109 Onwuamaegbu 2005; Luis Miguel Diaz and Nancy J. Oretskin, “Mediation Furthers the Principles of 
Transparency and Cooperation to Solve Disputes in the NAFTA Free Trade Area,” 30 D)(*. J. I(/’4 L. 
+(0 P.4’7 73 (2001) [Hereina$ er Diaz and Oretskin 2001].
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Nevertheless, for the purposes of clarity, managing the expectations and creating 
a common framework for discussion, this chapter draws a distinction between 
the two concepts. % e key di" erence between mediation and conciliation is 
the degree and formality of the process.
Mediation is an informal process in which mediators tend to focus on identi-
fying interests, reframing representations and canvassing a range of possible 
solutions to move the parties toward agreement.110 % ere are many forms of 
mediation, which might involve anything from a mediator serving as infor-
mation conduit or creating an atmosphere to loosen tension, to engaging in 
“shuttle diplomacy” to trying to transform the parties’ relationship.111 Mediation 
is not about using a series of rules or legal rights to resolve disputes. Rather, it 
uses a process-based model to bring two parties closer together toward 
agreement. Although there are variations, most mediation tends to focus on 
stages of dispute resolution including: (1) agreeing to mediate; (2) understanding 
the problem by identifying issues and interests; (3) generating options; (4) 
reaching agreement; and (5) implementing the agreement.112 What happens in 
the individual dispute is largely a function of the parties, the nature of the 
dispute and the orientation and approach of the mediator.
In contrast, given its historical roots in public international law, conciliation 
tends to provide a more structured process.113 Rather than relying on general 
guidelines, it is replete with formal rules related to jurisdictional objections, 
potential pleadings, the gathering of evidence and issuing written recommenda-
tions for settlement.114 % is makes the process more institutionalized, in a manner 
akin to formal adjudication. Arbitration commentators acknowledge this and 
describe conciliation as part of a “rules system” where the procedural formalities 
are articulated in advance—like civil procedure or evidentiary rules—to indicate 
how the process will operate and on what basis a neutral will make his or her 
determination.115 In this sense, the formality of the process makes conciliation 
looks more like non-binding arbitration.116 Nevertheless, as conciliation is aimed 
110 Merrills 2005; Reif 1991.
111 Menkel-Meadow et al. 2006.
112 Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation Training Guide (2004) [Hereina$ er Riskin 2004]; Kathleen Severens, Basic 
Mediation Training Manual, 5th Edition (International Institute for Negotiation and Con! ict Management: 
2005) [Hereina$ er Severens 2005]; Diaz and Oretskin 2001, pp. 84–86.
113 Mary Ellen O’Connell, ed., International Dispute Settlement (Ashgate Dartmouth: 2003), p. xvi.
114 Merrills 2005; Reif 1991.
115 Rubins 2006.
116 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
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at settlement from the outset, parties may be more likely to reach agreement 
than they would if participating in a full-scale adversary proceeding.117
Irrespective of whether it occurs in the context of mediation or conciliation, 
third-party neutrals can vary in their orientation and approach.118 % ere are a 
variety of di" erent models of facilitative ADR. % e approach of Len Riskin’s 
famous “Grid System” asks neutrals to consider whether: (1) the parties wish 
to de& ne their dispute broadly or narrowly, and (2) the neutral should adopt 
either an evaluative or facilitative orientation to problem-solving. In an 
“evaluative” approach, neutrals may & nd themselves focusing more on evaluating 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of the merits of parties’ factual and legal 
contentions in order to push settlement in a particular direction. In contrast, 
a “facilitative” approach may ask involved parties and the neutral party to 
focus more on identifying creative “win-win” strategies.119
Gary Friedman and Jack Himmelstein have also developed an “understanding-
based” model of mediation in which parties resolve their con! icts through 
understanding their adversary’s perspectives, priorities and concerns.120 Other 
scholars use transformative mediation as a means of transforming the rela-
tionship between disputing parties.121 Still others may & nd themselves moving 
between di" erent styles at di" erent points in the process.122 Nevertheless, 
regardless of the approach a particular neutral has, parties generally control 
selection of the neutral(s) and—as part of the appointment process—may 
condition appointment on using a particular set of tactics or approach during 
the facilitative ADR process. Particularly given the multiplicity of de& nitions 
available for both mediation and conciliation, setting expectations about what 
to expect from the neutral and the dispute resolution process is useful.
117 Lester Nurick and Stephen J. Schnably, ! e First ICSID Conciliation: Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Trinidad 
and Tobago, 1 ICSID R)*')=—F.,)'-( I(*)3/2)(/ L+= J.5,(+4 340, 349 (1986) [Hereina$ er Nurick 
and Schnably 1986].
118 Diaz and Oretskin 2001, pp. 86–87.
119 Leonard L. Riskin, “Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Guide for the 
Perplexed,” 1 H+,*. N)-./. L. R)*. 7 (1996) [Hereina$ er Riskin 1996]; Leonard L. Riskin, “Decision-
Making in Mediation: % e New Old Grid and the New New Grid System,” 79 N./,) D+2) L. R)*. 1 
(2003) [Hereina$ er Riskin 2003].
120 Gary J. Friedman and Jack Himmelstein, “Resolving Con! ict Together: % e Understanding-Based 
Approach to Mediation,” 4 J. A2. A,9. (2005) [Hereina$ er Friedman and Himmelstein 2006].
121 Robert A. Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger, ! e Promise of Mediation: ! e Transformative Approach to 
Con" ict, Rev. ed. (Jossey-Bass: 2005).
122 E. Patrick McDermott and Ruth Obar, “What’s Going On In Mediation: An Empirical Analysis of the 
In! uence of a Mediator’s Style on Party Satisfaction and Monetary Bene& t,” 9 H+,*. N)-./. L. R)*. 75, 
108–109 (2004) [Hereina$ er McDermott and Obar 2004].
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b. Using Mediation to Resolve Investment Disputes
UNCTAD has commented favorably about the creating of mediation as a 
pre-arbitration means of settling disputes, explaining “mediation may be a 
more useful means of reaching an amicable settlement than the use of 
comparatively formal conciliation proceedings.”123 Nevertheless, at present, 
ICSID does not provide mediation services. ICSID has expressed interest in 
establishing a mediation facility to allow parties to resolve disputes on a more 
informal, voluntary and con& dential basis—possibly even with a neutral who 
does not have subject matter expertise.124 % is approach may serve to facilitate 
communication, decrease the risk that settlement will cause a party to lose 
face, and narrow the issues in a dispute in order to achieve cost and time 
savings.125 While there have been some suggestions about what the process might 
entail, the future of ICSID’s e" orts to create a mediation facility is uncertain.126
Policymakers wanting to provide for mediation would need to address various 
structural matters such as: (1) should mediation be mandatory, (2) would or 
could it occur independently or concurrently with an imposed ADR process, 
or (3) whether it would be institutional or ad hoc. % ere might also be concerns 
about procedural issues, including the process of selecting mediators, the 
language and location of the mediation and the rules regarding con& dentiality.127
c. Using Conciliation to Resolve Investment Disputes
ICSID does have a facilitative ADR system for resolving investment disputes. 
Observing that there is a “particular importance to the availability of facilities 
for international conciliation,” the ICSID Convention establishes a process for 
making a request for conciliation, constituting a Conciliation Commission 
and de& ning the duties of the conciliators.128 % e Convention requires a 
Commission “to clarify the issues in dispute between the parties and to 
endeavor to bring about agreement between them upon mutually acceptable 
123 UNCTAD 2005b, pp. 53–54.
124 ICSID 2004, p. 4; Onwuamaegbu 2005.
125 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
126 % ere was a suggestion that mediation should be without prejudice to the rights of parties in other forms 
of dispute resolution. Similarly, it was suggested that mediation be conducted alongside arbitration pro-
ceedings so that a settlement agreement might ultimately be incorporated into an award pursuant to 
ICSID Arbitration Rules 43(2). Id.
127 Diaz and Oretskin 2001, p. 8.
128 ICSID 2006, pp. 19–21.
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terms [and]… may at any stage of the proceedings and from time to time 
recommend terms of settlement to the parties”. Meanwhile, it obligates the 
parties to “cooperate in good faith …[and] give their most serious consideration 
to [the Commission’s] recommendations.”129
While the ICSID’s Conciliation Rules do not articulate how the Commission 
and the parties should carry out their respective mandates, the Rules suggest 
the Commission may wish to take a more evaluative approach130 Rule 22 
permits the Commission at any time (either orally or in writing) to “recom-
mend that the parties accept speci& c terms of settlement or that they refrain … 
from speci& c acts that might aggravate the dispute [and] point out to the par-
ties the arguments in favor of its recommendations.” In keeping with the more 
formal nature of conciliation, the Conciliation Rules also let the Commission 
request written statements from the parties, rule on its own jurisdiction, rule 
on requests to disqualify conciliators, hold hearings, and take evidence in the 
form of documents or witness testimony and issue a report at the closure of 
the proceedings.131 Despite these suggested formalities, neither the ICSID 
Convention nor the Conciliation Rules suggest that conciliators are prohibited 
from engaging in less formal or facilitative actions; this implicitly suggests 
conciliators retain discretion to fashion the “forum to the fuss.”
% e Convention and Conciliation Rules require the Conciliation Commission 
to prepare a report. If the conciliation was successful, the report notes the 
issues in dispute and records that the parties have reached agreement. If, on 
the other hand, it appears to the Commission at any time during the process 
that there is no likelihood of agreement, the Commission’s report must simply 
note the submission of the dispute to conciliation and record the parties’ 
inability to reach agreement.132
In its e" ort to promote conciliation and provide investment-related dispute 
resolution services, ICSID also has Additional Facility Conciliation Rules for 
investor-State disputes where the parties have consented to conciliation. % e 
formal procedures for Additional Facility Conciliation are similar to the 
conciliation procedures occurring under the ICSID Convention, including 
129 Id., Art. 34(1), p. 21. % is is not dissimilar from the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules that permit the 
conciliator, at any stage of the proceedings, to make proposals for the settlement of a dispute (Nassib G. 
Ziadé, “ICSID Conciliation,” 13(2) News from ICSID, 3 (1996) [Hereina$ er Ziadé 1996], p. 6).
130 Nurick and Schnably 1986, p. 348.
131 ICSID 2006, pp. 89–97.
132 ICSID 2006, pp. 21, 97–98; Onwuamaegbu 2005.
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requesting written statements from the parties, challenges to jurisdiction and 
disquali& cation of conciliators, taking of evidence and issuing a report.133
As of 2006, ICSID’s website re! ects that it has only had & ve cases registered 
for conciliation: SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellscha%  für die 
Textilindustrie m.b.H. v. Madagascar (ICSID Case No. CONC/82/1); Tesoro 
Petroleum Corp. v. Trinidad and Tobago (ICSID Case No. CONC/83/1); 
SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellscha%  für die Textilindustrie m.b.H. v. 
Madagascar (ICSID Case No. CONC/94/1); TG World Petroleum Ltd. v. Niger 
(ICSID Case No. CONC/03/1); and Togo Electricité v. Republic of Togo (ICSID 
Case No. CONC/05/1).134 It is not apparent whether all these are all invest-
ment treaty cases, as substantive information about these conciliations is not 
publicly accessible. But to the extent that all ICSID cases involve investment 
con! ict, the available information suggests that conciliation can be e" ective in 
fostering settlement. In two cases, TG World and the & rst SEDITEX concilia-
tion, the parties reached a settlement soon a$ er the request for conciliation 
was registered and before a Commission was established. In a third case—in 
which Lord Wilberforce acted as sole conciliator—Tesoro ended with a 
successful settlement that caused counsel for the host country to write “use of 
ICSID’s conciliation facilities deserves serious consideration in every case.”135 
% e second SEDITEX case appears not to have been subject to further dispute 
resolution and was not registered for ICSID arbitration. In only one case, Togo 
Electricité, conciliation e" orts appear to have been unsuccessful, and ICSID 
registered a request for arbitration in the four days a$ er the conciliation 
proceedings closed.136
Although limited in number, these cases suggest that certain types of cases 
may be well-suited for conciliation. Noting that arbitration may be too adver-
sarial in some cases, counsel from ICSID explains that conciliation can be 
most e" ective in “cases in which the parties are engaged in an ongoing long-
term project, involving signi& cant amounts in sunk costs, where it is necessary 
to resolve disputes while the project is continuing. Disputes in oil and gas 
exploration projects, particularly, come to mind—as do mining and long-term 
133 ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, ICSID/11 (Apr. 2006) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/
AFR_English-& nal.pdf) [Hereina$ er ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2006], pp. 27–42.
134 ICSID, List of Pending Cases (as of 26 July 2006) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm) 
and List of Concluded Cases (as of 26 July 2006) (http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm) 
[Hereina$ er ICSID Pending and Concluded Cases 2006]; Onwuamaegbu 2005.
135 Nurick and Schnably 1986, p. 344.
136 ICSID Pending and Concluded Cases 2006.
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infrastructure projects.”137 Overall, the general anecdotal evidence suggests 
that conciliation can be used directly (as in Tesoro) or indirectly (as in TG 
World and SEDITEX) to facilitate settlement.
d. Challenges for Facilitative ADR
Despite this rosy picture, there are limitations to facilitative dispute resolution. 
Both mediation and conciliation can only be as e" ective as the parties wish it 
to be; and this factor may be governed by the parties’ immediate circumstances 
and the nature of the dispute.138 Beyond this, there are di#  culties generalizing 
about the e#  cacy of mediation and conciliation on the basis of ICSID’s 
conciliation data. % ere is a risk that the small and limited set of data from 
ICSID su" ers from sample bias. First, it is not clear whether the cases in which 
parties opted to conciliate are representative of the broader class of investment 
disputes, let alone treaty-based investment disputes. If the & ve cases were 
atypical, then there would be doubt as to the generalizability of conciliation’s 
utility in other situations. Second, the data only relate to conciliation at ICSID 
and do not address mediation or conciliation that occurs on an ad hoc basis or 
through a di" erent institution. Given the unique nature of the ICSID 
Convention and ICSID Conciliation, it is possible that mediation or conciliation 
occurring under di" erent auspices may be less (or possibly more) successful. 
It would be helpful to analyze how investment disputes might be resolved, for 
example, under the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. % ird, the success of 
mediation or conciliation may depend heavily upon the identity of the third-
party neutral. Where the parties have greater con& dence in the neutral, the 
recommendations are likely to carry greater weight and positively in! uence 
settlement.139 Likewise, if parties appoint neutrals with an insu#  cient degree 
of respect from both parties, they may be less successful.
With only & ve conciliation cases against 132 arbitration cases registered at 
ICSID in 2005,140 the sheer numbers suggest that ICSID Conciliation is a 
disfavored dispute resolution mechanism. Various factors may have led to this 
phenomenon. It may be caused by a lack of awareness of its existence. Counsel 
at ICSID has commented that “the Centre has recently begun to remind 
137 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
138 Merrills 2005, pp. 41–44, 88–90.
139 Nurick and Schnably 1986, p. 345.
140 UNCTAD 2005b, pp. 4–5.
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parties of the existence of the [conciliation] mechanism.”141 % is can cause 
downstream problems, as parties may be hesitant to use a dispute resolution 
mechanism viewed as untried and untested.
% e lack of use may also be a function of the ready availability of arbitration in 
BITs and parties’ preference for binding adjudication. Parties may view such 
non-binding dispute resolution as little more than a needless and time-
consuming exercise, as it can involve as much time as, and comparable expenses 
to, binding dispute resolution. Particularly, investors that have already 
experienced “protracted correspondence, negotiation, and perhaps even 
administrative battles with the State” may believe “the time has come for more 
forceful steps. Likewise, State parties may be unwilling to participate in a 
process that will not yield a solution imposed from the outside, for bureau-
cratic and political reasons.”142 Nevertheless, in certain cases, the “prospect of 
a binding award may be necessary to motivate one party or the other to 
bargain seriously” in conciliation.143
Negotiated and facilitated ADR share common di#  culties. Like its negotiated 
counterpart, facilitated ADR experiences challenges in obtaining party consent. 
Part of the problem may be a lack of an express consent to a facilitative ADR 
method in a BIT. Even with pre-existing consent, parties may not elect to use 
it or may choose to use it in a dilatory manner. Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah 
has suggested that conciliation can “be frustrated by the adoption of dilatory 
tactics.”144 In addition, there can be challenges with including the appropriate 
stakeholders and securing enforcement. In the public international law 
context, one need only consider the Rainbow Warrior situation, where France 
failed to abide by the terms of its mediated settlement and a binding dispute 
resolution was ultimately required.145
Facilitative ADR experiences other unique issues. As a neutral is involved in 
the facilitation process, it is vital to ensure that the neutral is both perceived to 
be and actually is independent and impartial. Decision-facilitators that lack 
these qualities may have an adverse impact on the legitimacy of the dispute 
resolution process. Another concern is that, given recent concerns about trans-
parency, governments may be disinclined to be involved in non-transparent 
141 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
142 Rubins 2006.
143 Nurick and Schnably 1986, p. 349.
144 Sornarajah 1994, p. 266.
145 Bederman 2001, pp. 236–237.
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dispute resolution mechanisms. Since facilitative ADR usually occurs in private 
and is o$ en subject to con& dentiality obligations, this may run counter toward 
the trend toward increased governmental openness.146 However, facilitated 
ADR mechanisms are di" erent from imposed ADR mechanisms that provide a 
public function by adjudicating public rights. Facilitative ADR is not rights-
based adjudication and the creation of legal norms, as it is primarily concerned 
with interest-based dispute resolution. Unlike fact-& nding or imposed ADR, in 
which con& dentiality inhibits a full and informed discussion of the disputes, 
con& dentiality in facilitated ADR is necessary to promote a forthright and 
e" ective discussion about the parties’ mutual interests and concerns. Without 
con& dentiality, the system functions ine#  ciently; it creates discomfort that 
inhibits the full and frank discussions that can lead to the articulation of party 
interests and mutually satisfactory resolutions.147 If parties were concerned that 
comments would be used against them later, this would inhibit the discussion 
necessary to create opportunities for a win-win settlement.148
Consideration of these concerns is vital. Nevertheless, “the unprecedented 
number of pending investor-State cases and the rate at which new cases are 
& led would seem to warrant a renewed dose of ‘serious consideration’ with a 
view to more fully institutionalizing” some sort of facilitated ADR regime.149 
Using dispute systems design to diagnose and appropriately adapt the system 
could integrate the strengths of a facilitative process while minimizing the 
risks of the challenges.
Fact-Finding ADR
Rather than a formal adjudication of substantive rights, fact-& nding ADR 
mechanisms involve identifying a neutral expert or special master to engage in 
basic fact-& nding in a dispute. % is mechanism is similar to an expert 
determination where a neutral fact-& nder, presumably with subject matter 
expertise, & nally resolves fundamental—yet contested—issues.150
146 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
147 Article 35 of the ICSID Convention provides for con& dentiality in conciliation proceedings. Interestingly, 
although parties are prevented from relying on views expressed by the other party or Commission reports 
or recommendations, there are no provisions as to the con& dentiality obligations of Conciliators or non-
parties a#  liated with the process. See ICSID 2006, p. 21.
148 Ziadé 1996, pp. 3–4.
149 Coe 2005, p. 44.
150 Merrills 2005, pp. 45–48; O’Connell 2003, pp. 26, 105–119.
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a. ! e Benefi ts of Fact-Finding
Fact-& nding has the potential to narrow the matters in dispute and create 
common ground between the parties. Particularly where there is a discrete 
issue—such as asset valuation—that can be de& nitively resolved at an earlier 
stage, this might lead to a quick resolution of a dispute. Put in more commercial 
terms, using fact-& nding to determine the scope of damages before liability 
may permit parties to bargain more e" ectively once the scope of precise liability 
is de& ned. Using fact-& nding could save time and costs, permit investors to 
concentrate on their core business and let host countries focus on the more 
pressing duties of government. Likewise, narrowing the scope of a potential 
dispute provides an opportunity to decrease the risk of escalating or exacer-
bating a dispute, which may be important when there is an ongoing relation-
ship. Beyond this, a fact-& nding body can construct a historical record 
that—much like the work of truth and reconciliation commissions—may 
produce bene& ts for both the parties and society at large.151
Unfortunately, the practical utility of using fact-& nding to resolve investment 
disputes is under-explored. % eoretically, as neither the Convention nor the 
Rules expressly prohibit such actions, an ICSID Conciliation Commission might 
be able to engage in fact-& nding as part of its mandate for recommending settle-
ment terms. ICSID Conciliation Rule 22(2) implies that fact-& nding may be a 
critical facility as, when it issues recommendations, the Commission “shall 
point out to the parties the arguments in favor of its recommendations.”152 
Given the con& dentiality limitations of ICSID Conciliation, there is little 
information on how neutral experts or panels resolve disputed factual issues 
through a conciliation facility.
Luckily, in 1978 ICSID created provisions for Additional Facility Fact-Finding. 
Aaron Broches, ICSID’s Secretary-General when the Fact Finding Rules were 
introduced, observed that the processes would provide parties with an impartial 
assessment of facts to prevent disputes on speci& c factual issues and the 
escalation of disputes.153
Unlike conciliation and arbitration, ICSID’s Fact-Finding Rules do not require 
at least one party be an ICSID member. Rather, provided both parties agree, 
151 Martha Minnow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History a% er Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Beacon Press: 1998).
152 ICSID 2006, p. 94.
153 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
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any investor or government can initiate a fact & nding proceeding. % e Fact-
Finding Rules provide that an independent committee—comprised of a sole 
or uneven number of commissioners—will examine the disputed facts and 
provide the parties with an impartial assessment.154 % e Rules envisage that 
there will be oral proceedings, written submissions, evidence and witness 
testimony. % e Fact-Finding proceedings end with a Report that “shall be 
limited to & ndings of fact. % e Report shall not contain any recommendations 
to the parties nor shall it have the character of an award,” and the parties will 
be “entirely free as to the e" ect to be given to the Report.”155 Although the 
parties could agree otherwise, it is, in other words, primarily a form of 
non-binding dispute resolution.
As originally conceived, Additional Facility Fact-Finding was intended to be 
“a process for preventing, rather than settling legal disputes as a result of a 
perceived need for fact-& nding proceedings in the ‘pre-dispute’ stage.”156 
Nevertheless, in nearly 30 years, no cases have ever been brought under this 
Facility.157 % is may be due to many of the same problems facing ICSID 
Conciliation. People may be unaware of the existence of the Fact-Finding 
Facility. Moreover, the lack of a critical mass of cases establishing it as a tried 
and tested method of dispute resolution may inhibit parties from using it. % e 
default, non-binding nature of the fact-& nding may also make it inappropriate 
for some cases.158
Although the Fact-Finding Facility has su" ered from non-use, fact-& nding 
deserves renewed consideration. % ere are minimal institutional costs to 
maintaining the current facility. Reconsidering its structure and & nding ways 
to make it more acceptable to stakeholders might actually increase the utility 
of the process.
In the public international law context, fact-& nding bodies, such as the 
“inquiry” process at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, have been useful in 
making an impartial investigation of disputed facts. % e Dogger Bank incident 
154 ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding 
Proceedings (January 2003) (http://worldbank.com/icsid/facility-archive/facility-en.htm) [Hereina$ er 
ICSID Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding 2003], p. vi.
155 ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2006, pp. 20–22.
156 ICSID Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration and Fact-Finding 2003, p. vi.
157 Onwuamaegbu 2005.
158 One wonders whether ICSID Fact-Finding would be more e" ective if the Additional Facility rules were 
amended to provide binding dispute resolution.
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is a classic example. In Dogger Bank, a Russian ! eet on its way through the 
North Sea & red on English commercial & shing trawlers; one vessel was sunk, 
the remaining two ships were seriously damaged, and there were two dead and 
six wounded among the civilian crew. % e Russians claimed they were attacked 
by Japanese torpedo boats mingling with the trawlers; if this were true, it 
would have justi& ed the Russian action. % e parties submitted this disputed 
factual issue to an International Commission of Inquiry. % e inquiry found 
“there was no torpedo boat either among the trawlers nor on the spot, [and] 
the & re opened by Admiral Rozhdestvensky was not justi& able.” A$ er this 
single fact was established, the con! ict was resolved and Russia gave the United 
Kingdom an indemnity of £65,000.159 Cases such as this suggest that there is 
hidden utility in this methodology that deserves further exploration.
b. ! e Challenges of Using Fact-Finding to Resolve Investment Confl ict
% ere are various di#  culties associated with using Fact-Finding ADR. Dogger 
Bank is only one of & ve fact-& nding commissions at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, which suggests fact-& nding processes may not be suitable for 
broad types of dispute resolution.160 Moreover, as investment disputes o$ en 
involve disputes of fact, law and mixed questions of fact and law, many cases 
may not be suitable for fact-& nding. Pure fact-& nding commissions might 
complicate—rather than streamline—the dispute resolution process. As fact-
& nding does not generally appear as a dispute resolution option in investment 
treaties, it may prove di#  cult to get party consent. A$ er a dispute has arisen, 
it may be challenging to secure party agreement on the use of fact-& nding.
% ere may be other di#  culties. Both the investor and State must be willing to 
accept that a fact-& nding body—possibly in public161—may show that their 
159 Merrills 2005, pp. 47–48.
160 “Dispute Settlement: General Topics—1.3,” UNCTAD, Permanent Court of Arbitration, UNCTAD/
EDM/Misc.232/Add.26 (2003) (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf) [Hereina$ er 
UNCTAD 2003a], p. 12.
161 % e con& dentiality of ICSID’s Fact Finding Additional Facility is uncertain. % e Commission certainly 
has con& dentiality obligations, which were “aimed at fostering an environment of free and uninhibited 
negotiations…[where] either party would not be restrained by the fear of prejudicing itself should the 
conciliation prove fruitless” (Ziadé 1996, p. 4). Article 8 requires commissioners to declare they “shall 
keep con& dential all information coming into my knowledge as a result of my participation in the 
proceeding as well as contents of any report drawn up by the committee”; and Article 9 provides that that 
the “sessions of the Committee shall not be public” (ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2006, pp. 19–20). 
Likewise, Article 4(5) of the Additional Facility Rules requires the Secretary-General to “keep con& dential 
any or all information furnished to him” (Id., p. 12). Nevertheless, the rules are silent as to whether the 
Sauvant_Chapter 9.indd   182 2/12/08   7:22:32 PM
R*+$')&-*"&'( D&)/0#* R*)$10#&$' &' I'#*"'!#&$'!1 I'2*)#%*'# A("**%*'#)
183
version of the facts is wrong. As a practical matter, parties may be unwilling to 
subject themselves to the scrutiny and potential embarrassment. % ere is some 
evidence that States may be particularly sensitive to a risk of loss, particularly 
when it involves reputational harm.162 Finally, there may be enforcement 
di#  culties, particularly where parties have not agreed to be bound by the 
factual determinations. While noteworthy, these concerns should not mean 
investors and States reject this option out of hand. Rather, parties may wish to 
consider creating a system that incorporates fact-& nding facilities at an 
appropriate juncture for appropriate disputes.
Advisory ADR
Advisory ADR might be used to evaluate and “reality-test” the parties’ respec-
tive claims so that they can make more informed decisions as to the utility of 
pursuing formal adjudication. % is might involve engaging in some sort of early 
evaluation by a neutral, a mini-trial or some form of non-binding arbitration.
a. Opportunities for Advisory ADR
In early neutral evaluation, parties may choose a third party to provide an 
opinion on a legal issue in dispute. In the U.S. domestic context, early neutral 
evaluation has been used successfully to resolve claims. One empirical study 
indicates that 80% of lawyers who were required by a court to go through this 
process later reported they were satis& ed with the process and would voluntarily 
use early neutral evaluation in the future. % e same study also suggested that 
the key predictor to having a successful early neutral evaluation was the 
attitude and skills of the neutral evaluator.163
A mini-trial typically involves attorneys for each side presenting the major 
aspects of their case to a tribunal composed of their respective clients as well 
as a presiding neutral who can then advise about a probable outcome and 
parties have a duty of con& dentiality or whether the public is prevented from attending those hearings 
that are not committee sessions, which are related to the proceeding.
162 Andrew T. Guzman, “% e Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms,” 31 J. L)-+4 S/50. 303 (2002).
163 Joshua D. Rosenberg and H. Jay Folberg, “Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis,” 46 
S/+(. L. R)*. 1847 (1994) [Hereina$ er Rosenberg and Folberg 1994].
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work with the clients to facilitate settlement.164 Corporate entities have used 
mini-trials successfully to promote the free exchange of information and focus 
the minds of top management on the strengths and weaknesses of their respec-
tive cases. % e private nature of this process has the potential to minimize costs 
and time allocated to dispute resolution, preserve an on-going relationship and 
avoid potential public embarrassment.
Little work has been done to consider how these procedures might apply in 
the context of investment disputes. % is may be due to the challenges that 
these forms of dispute resolution are likely to face. Presumably some of the 
bene& ts of early neutral evaluation might be captured by formats such as 
ICSID Conciliation or ICSID Additional Facility Conciliation. Moreover, there 
is an argument that ICSID Conciliation already essentially is non-binding 
arbitration. % ere may be critical bene& ts to working within an existing 
institution, such as ICSID. Provided it is not inconsistent with the ICSID 
Convention, it may be possible to modify the nature of the dispute resolution 
services—or the parties’ expectations in how they will be utilized—in order to 
capture bene& ts from other ADR formats.
b. Challenges Related to Advisory ADR
Despite the bene& ts, there are inevitably potential costs. Mini-trial and non-
binding arbitration have challenges similar to those experienced by imposed 
ADR—namely they arguably have all of the costs and none of the bene& ts of 
reaching a binding decision. Moreover, to the extent that these non-binding 
proceedings have the look and feel of binding dispute resolution but are 
nevertheless private, there may still be concerns related to the public interest 
and a lack of transparency. Particularly in the context of a mini-trial, non-
governmental organizations may wish to participate in the process; and there 
may be repercussions for exclusion. One also wonders, however, whether 
States have the same cost-bene& t calculus as investors. Presumably foreign 
investors are rationale actors motivated by the need for pro& t and would be 
willing to settle under the acceptable commercial conditions; nevertheless, this 
may not always be the case and investors may not be able to use the process 
e" ectively. Meanwhile, host country governments—who may be in! uenced by 
commercial realities—may be more motivated by political objectives. 
% ey may also lack the ! exibility to settle on purely commercial terms. 
164 Costantino and Merchant 1996, p. 40.
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Other factors such as clear authority to settle, the availability of funds, the 
legal risk and the likelihood of recovery may a" ect a government’s ability to 
accept the result of early neutral evaluation or a mini-trial. Nevertheless, it is 
possible that certain disputes might bene& t from the availability of this 
process, and thus this issue is worthy of more systematic consideration.
Imposed ADR
Imposed ADR is at the most formal end of the dispute resolution continuum. 
Imposed ADR procedures typically involve an adjudicatory body making a 
& nal and binding decision. In this context, adjudicators are typically neutral 
and may base their decisions upon legal principles.165 In the international 
context, the precise format of imposed ADR can vary. % e adjudicators might 
be either arbitrators or judges; and judges may either come from national 
courts or international judicial bodies. % e adjudication process may occur at 
a mixed claims commission, a claims tribunal akin to the Iran–U.S. Claims 
Tribunal, a series of independent ad hoc arbitral tribunals, or litigation under 
the auspices of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It might also take the 
form of international litigation before a national court. Under each of these 
approaches, the adjudicators will be bound to follow di" erent set of rules and 
regulations during the process of resolving the parties’ dispute.
a. ! e Benefi ts of Imposed ADR
% is chapter has already alluded to a variety of bene& ts to using an imposed 
ADR option. % e nature of imposed ADR makes its availability critical to 
promote the & nal and binding adjudication—and permit bargaining in its 
proverbial shadow. Many (but not all) imposed ADR methods—particularly 
arbitration and national court judgments—have the bene& t of e#  cient 
international enforceability. Imposed ADR has also experienced an increased 
push toward transparency, which promotes democratic values. Admittedly, 
imposed ADR varies in its commitment to transparency. % e proceedings 
before the ICJ and the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal are typically open to the 
public. Many—but not all—national courts are transparent. Meanwhile, there 
is an increasing trend toward transparency in investment treaty arbitration.166
165 Merrills 2005, pp. 91–92.
166 Franck 2005a; Franck 2005b.
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Speci& c forms of imposed ADR may have unique bene& ts. Arbitration and 
mixed claims commissions have the added bene& t of being able to tailor the 
procedural framework to the issues in the particular dispute. % ey also o" er 
the bene& t of limited opportunities to attack the adjudicator’s decision, which 
further streamlines the dispute resolution procedure. Presumably, such tailoring 
is likely to create disputes that may be faster and less expensive than their 
counterparts in national court litigation. Beyond this, there may be utility in 
being able to “blame any unfavorable result on three foreign arbitrators” and 
shi$  responsibility away from the parties.167
b. ! e Costs of Imposed ADR
Nevertheless, not all of these theoretical bene& ts are realized. Arbitration has 
particular risks.
i. Lost Time and Money
Cases can take years to arbitrate and cost more than litigation or other forms 
of dispute resolution.168 Anecdotal evidence in the investment context 
suggests a similar phenomenon, which suggests that—rather than focusing on 
their core commercial or governmental objectives—parties expend signi& cant 
resources on dispute resolution. Even investors that have successfully claimed 
under investment suggest that investment arbitration is simply “too slow, too 
costly and too indeterminate.”169 Increased & scal costs for resolving disputes 
implicate other hidden costs, which may limit parties’ access to justice. 
A smaller corporate investor, particularly with a small dispute, may be unable 
to pursue arbitration because of the extensive costs—even though the investor 
is being deprived of investment rights. % e situation is more pronounced when 
a group of small companies are each experiencing distinct deprivations, but 
have no commercial choice but to absorb the cost of the violation of their legal 
rights.170 Likewise, a host country government with limited & nancial resources 
may experience a similar phenomenon when it must defend itself on an 
inadequate budget. Ultimately, the & nancial cost of imposed ADR may, 
167 Jeswald Salacuse, Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution (2006), p. 14 
[copy on & le with author].
168 Christian Bühring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business (Kluwer: 1996), 
pp. 140–148.
169 Coe 2005, p. 9.
170 Vicuña 2001.
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as a practical matter, limit those who have access to the forum. % is suggests 
that the stakeholders may be bene& ted from a system that provides a broader 
set of ADR mechanisms.
ii. Arbitrator Neutrality
% ere are also concerns that arbitrators are not perceived to be neutral in their 
adjudication. While there are opportunities to challenge arbitrators who lack 
impartiality or independence, there are nonetheless continuing reasons for 
parties’ negative perceptions of the fairness and integrity of the dispute resolution 
process. % ere may, for example, be di#  culties related to an arbitrator’s potential 
“issue con! icts,” where the same person serves as arbitrator and counsel in 
two separate cases with related legal issues and has the capacity to create legal 
authority as an arbitrator that may be of bene& t to a client in his or her role as 
counsel.171 Similarly, arbitrators may act as non-neutrals or advocates; there is 
also the possibility of “toxic” arbitrators who may disrupt or delay proceedings 
to the advantage of one party.172
iii. Party Control Over Outcome
Although control of the dispute resolution process is also a bene& t, this may 
be illusory. Investment treaties typically present investors with pre-determined 
options for where and how their disputes can be resolved through arbitration. 
Although having one option is better than none, one wonders, for example, 
why countries would want to close the door to their local courthouses or other 
forms of imposed ADR. For example, although Mexico is willing to entertain 
NAFTA-based investment litigation, domestic legislation in the United States 
and Canada appears to prevent foreign investors from bringing NAFTA claims 
in their respective national courts.173 Likewise, one wonders whether Argentina 
would have been happier with an option to create a mixed claims commission 
to deal with the universe of claims it received as a result of its currency crisis. 
Beyond a simple choice of forum, requiring arbitration presupposes the use of 
procedural rules that investors had little opportunity to negotiate; and while 
171 Judith Levine, “Dealing With Arbitrator ‘Issue Con! icts’ in International Arbitration,” 61 A:,. D'3:. 
R)3.4. J. 60 (2006) [Hereina$ er Levine 2006].
172 James H. Carter, “Improving Life with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer Conduct Guidelines for 
‘Nonneutrals,’ ” 11 A2. R)*. I(/’4 A,9. 295 (2000) [Hereina$ er Carter 2000]; Susan D. Franck, “% e Role 
of the International Arbitrator,” 12 ILSA J. I(/’4 +(0 C.2:. L. 499 (2006) [Hereina$ er Franck 2006].
173 Franck 2005b.
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parties can attempt to agree to variations a$ er the fact, as a practical matter 
this may prove challenging once a dispute has arisen.
iv. Transposing Benefi ts into Costs: Confi dentiality and Discretion
In the context of treaty arbitration, some of the bene& ts of arbitration can 
become costs. Con& dentiality and discretion are two key examples. 
Con& dentiality was historically extolled as a reason to opt for arbitration. 
Nevertheless, the lack of transparency of the awards and the process of 
resolving investment disputes has costs. Investment treaties are public 
documents that articulate public law rights, which are fundamentally di" erent 
from private commercial rights in at least two ways.
First, treaty disputes have considerable third-party implications that implicate 
the public interest.174 Beyond the e" ect experienced by a foreign investor or its 
shareholders, investment arbitration a" ects taxpayers of the host government as 
well as entities impacted by its legislative and regulatory choices.175 Excluding 
those impacted by the resolution of the investment dispute can foster a sense of 
unfairness and a lack of procedural justice. Particularly for democratic institu-
tions with a tradition of giving the governed a voice in the process of govern-
ment, this can lead to a backlash with & nancial and political costs. As a result, it 
is unsurprising that governments such as those of the United States and Canada 
have worked to redress this procedural di#  culty by making access to awards, 
pleadings and hearings more open.176 What is more surprising, however, is the 
failure of other countries with democratic institutions to follow this lead.
Second, because these awards interpret new international investment rights, 
keeping treaty claims con& dential prevents the e#  cient and consistent devel-
opment of a coherent and considered legal doctrine. Unlike commercial law 
where there is a developed body of law and precedent, investment treaty law is 
relatively new. As a result, there is a dearth of established legal doctrine. % e 
awards in recent cases that are publicly available have only just begun to sketch 
the boundaries of legal rights, and the academic literature is still in its formative 
years. While making awards public arguably increases the cost of arbitration—
as tribunals and parties must address them—this overlooks fundamental costs 
174 OECD, “Transparency and % ird Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures: 
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of con& dentiality. % e availability of analogous cases, legal reasoning or amicus 
submissions can increase the e#  ciency of a tribunal’s determinations and 
improve the quality of the tribunal’s reasoning. In addition, by signaling that 
like cases will be treated alike, it promotes perceptions of fairness and 
supports the legitimacy of the process.
Con& dentiality also leads to uncertainty for both investors and host 
governments attempting, respectively, to organize their investments, make 
governmental policy and determine dispute resolution strategy. Without a 
sense of how the law will be applied—and access to the awards making those 
determinations—there can be little justi& ed reliance. While investment 
arbitration awards are not de jure precedent, tribunals and parties treat them 
as de facto authority and rely upon them. Keeping cases con& dential deprives 
tribunals of useful reasoning, prevents tribunals from treating like cases alike 
and also denies investors and governments a reasonable opportunity to organize 
their respective a" airs in accordance with articulated legal standards.
It seems that governments originally thought that con& dentiality was appro-
priate. Presumably this may have been because they anticipated that there 
would only be a small number of claims and there was no need to publicize the 
possibility of government liability; governments may also have been less con-
cerned about inconsistencies in the decisions because, with con& dentiality, 
there would be blissful ignorance of potential inconsistencies. Recent history, 
however, demonstrates the fallacy of both these propositions. % e number of 
claims has increased; and as arbitrators search for authority to inform their 
own reasoning when faced with novel legal rights, they have sought out 
similar awards. Because of the critical nature of the issues raised in investment 
disputes, awards have found their way into the public domain. As the historical 
bene& t becomes a liability, the future challenge will be how best to manage the 
need for con& dentiality against the desirability of public access.
% e use of arbitrators’ open-textured discretion to adjudicate cases has also 
created unexpected costs.177 In some contexts, parties may need arbitrators to 
exercise more discretion to issue awards quickly with minimal legal reasoning. 
% is might be desirable in certain circumstances. For example, in labor 
arbitration there is a preference for & nal discretionary awards that need not be 
consistent; this can help prevent labor unrest. Nevertheless, in the context of 
177 Coe 2005; Michael A. Scodro, “Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power,” 55 D5<) L.J. 547 
(2005).
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investment treaty claims, unreasoned and quick awards may be undesirable. It 
can create confusion. Unexplained decisions create di#  culties for parties and 
arbitrators in understanding the scope of substantive investor protections and 
what circumstances should constitute liability-creating events. It can also 
increase litigation risk where tribunals make procedural determinations with 
an outcome-determinative e" ect. If, for example, tribunals exercise discretion 
to shi$  arbitration costs under the applicable rules—but they do not explain 
either the legal authority for or their rationale for making a decision—parties 
may question the fairness and basis of the determination. Likewise, if arbitra-
tors do not shi$  costs, and still do not explain why, investors and governments 
are again le$  in the same precarious situations wondering what factors justify 
the determination. Perhaps more importantly, investors and host governments 
involved in future disputes will have minimal information available to them to 
predict how future tribunals might evaluate costs-related measures, which 
may not be an insigni& cant aspect in the case. In Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia, 
while the investor claimed at least US$25,000,000 in damages, the settlement 
ultimately made Bolivia responsible for US$1,600,000 in legal fees—well over 
5% of the claimed compensation.178 As parties bargain in the shadow of the 
law, relying on arbitrator discretion—without information about how rules, 
standards, practice, and precedence will in! uence the exercise of that 
discretion—prevents parties from negotiating e" ectively. Without reliable and 
predictable information about the potential costs of the arbitration procedure, 
there could be an adverse impact on parties’ capacity to engage in an accurate 
and clear cost-bene& t calculus.
c. Moving Beyond Investment Treaty Arbitration
Ultimately, investment treaty arbitration may not be everything its creators 
wished it to be. % ere are a variety of factors that suggest the theoretical bene& ts 
of arbitration may not materialize and purported bene& ts can transform into 
costs. % is ultimately suggests that it is unwise to focus unduly on arbitration 
as an all-purpose paradigm.
It does suggest that the time is right to consider proactively how to use other 
imposed ADR mechanisms—such as a claims commission—to resolve 
disputes with & nality. % ere have been some suggestions, for instance, that this 
178 Paul Harris, Company Drops Demand over Water Contract Canceling, S+( F,+(8'38. C1,.('84) (19 
January 2006) p. A–3.
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format might address concerns related both to transparency and consistency.179 
Likewise, it suggests that it may be useful to think systematically about the 
range of ADR mechanisms. As this chapter suggests, other processes—
particularly underutilized facilities at ICSID and with ombuds—are promising 
options. % e challenge will be to determine the right blend of party autonomy, 
e#  ciency and due process for a wide range of circumstances.
% ere has been some scholarship that has begun to consider how speci& c 
aspects of the ADR continuum, namely mediation and conciliation, might 
usefully improve the system.180 Coe has made signi& cant strides in thinking 
systematically about how and when to use facilitated ADR in connection with 
imposed ADR. Nevertheless, one wonders whether this conception of the 
problem is overly narrow. % e challenge may be to expand one’s conception of 
con! ict management to think more broadly about how to diagnose the di#  -
culties the system is facing, critique the existing process and provide principles 
to guide the creation of e" ective and legitimate dispute resolution systems.
Challenges for the Future
% e challenge for the future is how to think seriously about the value of design-
ing comprehensive dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve investment 
disputes. Being systematic in the approach to con! ict management could 
provide a unique opportunity to capitalize on the e#  ciency of various 
processes across the ADR continuum. It also provides an opportunity to 
increase satisfaction both with the process and the ultimate result, as well as 
promoting integrity of the dispute resolution system. Nevertheless, there will 
be challenges as di" erent governments perhaps make di" erent assessments of 
the utility of engaging in this level of con! ict management.
We are at a unique historical juncture in the evolution of resolving invest-
ment-related disputes. We have an opportunity not just to ask how to improve 
the arbitration system by focusing on issues such as transparency, consistency 
and coherence; rather we can and should consider how to manage con! ict 
related to investment treaties in a systematic manner. Arbitration is no doubt 
part of that puzzle. But as the review of the dispute resolution continuum 
suggests, there are other opportunities worthy of ongoing consideration. 
179 W. Michael Reisman, “Control Mechanisms in International Dispute Resolution,” 2 U.S.–M)>. L.J. 129, 
136–137 (1994); Franck 2005b, pp. 81–82.
180 Coe 2006; Rubins 2006; Legum 2005; Onwuamaegbu 2006.
Sauvant_Chapter 9.indd   191 2/12/08   7:22:33 PM
P!"# III: P"$%$#&'( C$')&)#*'+, !'- C$.*"*'+*
192
% e opportunity to decrease costs, increase e#  ciency and interject procedural 
fairness in the system should not be discounted. % e evaluation of the 
structure can provide a reasoned explanation for the status quo and give 
stakeholders a" ected by the outcome of disputes a chance to participate in the 
system’s creation. Ultimately, such an analysis has the unique bene& t of 
strengthening the legitimacy of the dispute resolution process and giving 
stakeholders con& dence in the system’s capacity to protect their rights and 
produce just results.
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